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Editorial
Financial markets remain under serious stress 
and the turmoil is now impacting the real 
economy. From the outset, the EU has taken 
decisive action to manage the financial side of 
the crisis. Governments, the Commission and 
the ECB have been working closely together to 
contain the turmoil, protect savings and maintain 
a flow of credit for businesses and households. 
The European Central Bank repeatedly injected 
liquidity into markets and in consecutive steps 
cut its base rate by a cumulated 175 basis points. 
The October agreement by Member States on an 
EU rescue package for banks paved the way for 
coordinated national responses. Most Member 
States have either implemented or are in the 
process of implementing comprehensive rescue 
packages with a view to restore market 
confidence. On top of increased access to 
liquidity from central banks, the national plans 
comprise various elements, including state-
backed guarantees for bank liabilities, and capital 
injections into financial institutions. Moreover, 
almost all Member States have announced an 
increase in the level of minimum deposit 
insurance and committed to speed up the 
disbursement of refund in case of a default.  
The Commission has been playing a key role by 
facilitating the implementation of rescue 
measures, by speeding up its decisions on state 
aid aspects in light of the exceptional 
circumstances while safeguarding a level playing 
field. The Commission is also closely monitoring 
their implementation to ensure coherence and 
prevent distortions in the Internal Market. To 
this end it has adopted guidelines for bank 
guarantees and recapitalisation schemes. 
The measures have prevented a melt-down in the 
financial sector. Market reactions so far have 
been positive with a progressive improvement in 
the functioning of interbank markets in the past 
weeks, but market tensions are still 
extraordinarily high.  
The impact of the financial turmoil on the real 
economy is becoming conspicuous. In the third 
quarter, euro-area GDP was down for the second 
quarter in a row, contracting by 0.2% compared 
to the previous quarter. The weakness was 
broad-based. Although net exports were the 
main negative contributor to growth, gross fixed 
capital formation also contracted – for the 
second consecutive quarter – under the 
combined effect of a sharp correction in housing 
markets and signs of weakness in business 
investment. Household consumption remained 
very sluggish in the face of rising unemployment 
and will likely remain subdued. However, the 
recent ebbing of commodity prices – particularly 
oil prices – will provide some support to 
households and companies. 
Business and consumer confidence, on a 
weakening path since the summer 2007, have 
experienced an unprecedented deterioration in 
the past couple of months, pointing to further 
contraction in activity in the months to come for 
the euro area and the world economy.  
Banks are key players in the euro-area financial 
system. While banks' loan provision to non-
financial corporations still grows strongly, the 
actual numbers are somewhat misleading, and 
forward looking indicators point at a substantial 
tightening of credit standards due to the impact 
of the financial crisis and negative feedback loops 
form the real economy. As shown in this report, 
loans supply is a crucial determinant of short-
term economic growth in the euro area. While 
some deleveraging of the financial sector appears 
necessary, a strong downsizing of banks' balance 
sheets due to write-offs of toxic assets could 
exert a significant drag on euro-area domestic 
demand. There is a risk that a vicious circle sets 
in, with falling domestic demand hampering 
credit supply via reduced borrowers 
creditworthiness and credit supply in turn further 
weighing on domestic demand. Such a vicious 
circle could have dramatic consequences for jobs 
and growth in the euro area. Bank 
recapitalization is therefore of crucial importance 
to avoid serious consequences for the economy. 
Productive investment is facing a sharp 
downswing under the combined effects of the 
ongoing economic downturn and, in a more 
medium-term perspective, a general re-pricing of 
risk. As shown in this report, the unfolding of 
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the financial turmoil will entail a sharper short-
run cyclical correction in investment than in the 
previous downturn of the early 2000s as the 
corporate sector faces a marked risk of a credit 
retrenchment due to a weakened banking sector. 
In the medium term, the financial turmoil is 
likely to lead to a general re-pricing of risk that 
will weigh on equity values and push the cost of 
capital durably up. This will further impact 
investment demand both through the capital cost 
and the balance sheet channels. 
Given the severe risks of a deep and protracted 
recession, there is a strong case for coordinated 
complementary action to support the real 
economy and prevent further negative feedback 
from the real economy on the financial sector. 
The European Commission has therefore 
adopted an ambitious European Economic Recovery 
Plan on 26 November 2008, which was broadly 
endorsed by the European Council of 12 
December. The immediate priority of the 
Recovery Plan is to mitigate the potential impact 
of the financial turmoil on the real economy and 
thereby underpin market confidence. To be 
effective, it needs to be swiftly implemented. 
The Recovery Plan consists of two main pillars. 
The first pillar is a major impulse amounting to 
€200 billion, i.e. equivalent to 1.5% of EU GDP 
to boost demand. It consists of a budgetary 
expansion by Member States of €170 billion and 
EU funding in support of immediate actions in 
the order of €30 bn. A second pillar endorses a 
number of priority actions, grounded in the 
Lisbon Strategy. They are designed to adapt the 
EU economies to long-term challenges such as 
climate change and ageing. The implementation 
of structural reforms must continue with a view 
to raising potential growth. 
In the face of a global demand shock, with 
monetary policy partially weakened, a 
discretionary impulse of significant magnitude, 
over and above the already important role of 
automatic stabilizers, is necessary to insure 
against the prospect of a deep and long-lived 
recession. In order to maximise its effectiveness, 
the fiscal response needs to be timely, targeted, 
temporary and coordinated. The fiscal impulse 
should be put into place as soon as possible and 
it should combine short-run demand effects with 
positive long-run effects. To increase its 
effectiveness, it is central that the impulse is 
temporary and does not lead to a permanent 
deterioration of the structural balance. Moreover, 
it should be fully embedded in the SGP to assure 
continued market confidence in the sustainability 
of public finances. 
Euro-area Member States should coordinate their 
fiscal response to multiply their positive impact 
and ensure long-term budgetary sustainability. A 
fiscal expansion will have greatest impact on 
national economies if jointly undertaken. The 
size of the fiscal impulse should be differentiated 
across Member States as they have different 
room for manoeuvre in terms of fiscal as well as 
external space. In countries with high deficits and 
debt levels, a stimulus could prove less effective 
as it raises sustainability concerns. In countries 
with poor competitiveness and large current 
account deficits, a large fiscal stimulus would 
worsen competitiveness problems and slow 
down necessary adjustment. Countries with large 
current account as well as public deficits may 
have no room for fiscal stimulus. In contrast, 
countries with current account surpluses could 
reduce their imbalances through a significant 
domestic expansion. Here, a larger fiscal 
expansion would be of significant domestic as 
well as euro-area benefit. Countries in 
intermediate situations should consider 
combinations of fiscal stimulus and structural 
reforms that maintain growth in the short run 
and improve sustainability in the medium term. 
I am confident that such a common European 
response will contribute to mitigating the effects 
of the crisis on European citizens and will help 
Europe to emerge stronger from the crisis. 
 
 
MARCO BUTI 
DIRECTOR GENERAL  
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I. A European Economic Recovery Plan  
The global financial crisis has considerably darkened the economic outlook for 2009. The euro area has entered into recession 
territory and market confidence is low. Financing conditions have tightened, investment as well as bank lending might be 
seriously affected by the financial crisis (See Part II – Economic and financial situation in the euro area). The European 
Commission has therefore adopted a communication on 'A European Economic Recovery Programme', which aims at 
securing confidence in the financial system and mitigating the effects of the crisis on the real economy. The plan was broadly 
endorsed by the Ecofin council. It consists of two pillars: a significant fiscal boost and set of structural reforms. This section 
discusses the central elements of the plan and provides an economic rationale for the measures adopted.  
 
Global financial crisis calls for quick and 
decisive action 
The global financial crisis has impacted the EU 
hard and the current downturn appears to be the 
worst in several decades. Part II of this Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area discusses the current 
economic situation and points at substantial 
downward risks regarding economic prospects 
for 2009 as well as 2010. The euro-area economy 
has entered into recession territory. Financial 
market conditions remain fragile and are likely to 
be tighter for longer than expected. Confidence 
among households and firms has fallen much 
lower than expected and the slowdown has 
spread to emerging economies with negative 
effects for European exports. A vicious circle of 
falling domestic demand putting a drag on credit 
supply in turn further affecting demand, in 
particular investment could emerge. 
Quick and decisive action is needed to prevent a 
downward spiral. The European Commission has 
therefore adopted on 26 November 2008 a 
communication on A European Economic Recovery 
Plan, which was broadly endorsed by the 
European Council of 12 December. The 
immediate priority of the Recovery Plan is to 
secure full confidence in the financial system and 
to mitigate the potential impact of the crisis on 
the real economy. The Recovery Plan consists of 
two main pillars. 
The first pillar is a major budgetary impulse 
amounting to €200 billion (1.5% of EU GDP) to 
boost demand in full respect of the Stability and 
Growth Pact. It is made up of a budgetary 
expansion by Member States of €170 billion and 
EU funding in support of immediate actions in 
the order of €30 bn. 
A second pillar consists of a number of priority 
actions, grounded in the Lisbon Strategy, and 
designed at the same time to adapt the EU 
economies to long-term challenges and to 
continue implementing structural reforms aimed 
at raising potential growth. 
The need for a fiscal stimulus 
Macroeconomic policies have an especially 
important role to play in the face of a global 
demand shock. Monetary policy authorities have 
already cut interest rates in the light of reduced 
inflationary expectations over the medium-term.  
Fiscal policy is needed to further support real 
economic activity. Restoring confidence is crucial 
and depends on Europe's ability to boost 
demand. Only a significant stimulus package can 
counter the downward trend in demand with its 
negative knock-on effects in investment and 
employment. The discretionary stimulus should 
be enacted timely, i.e. now, and be made in 
addition to the automatic stabilizers, which 
should operate fully. Moreover, it should be 
consistent with the revised Stability and Growth 
pact to ensure confidence in the medium-term 
sustainability of public finances.  Member States 
should commit to reverse the budgetary 
deterioration and return to the aims set out in the 
medium term objectives once the recession is 
over. The stimulus should therefore be 
temporary. 
The fiscal stimulus should be targeted towards 
the sources of economic challenges (e.g. 
increasing unemployment, credit constrained 
firms and households) as this maximizes the 
stabilisation impact of limited budgetary 
resources. The stimulus should thus be targeted 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2008 
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to areas where the budgetary multiplier is large 
(see Box 1). Public spending has larger 
multipliers in the short-term compared to tax 
cuts. Public expenditure has direct demand 
effects in the short run if used for the purchase 
of goods and services and investment. Public 
transfers to households have only indirect 
demand effects with the actual multiplier 
depending crucially on households' marginal 
propensity to consume. If transfers are directed 
to unemployed and low-income households, the 
effect of the stimulus is larger than for middle to 
high-income households. In other words, 
transfers to households should be targeted to 
those households that are least Ricardian and will 
actually spend it. 
A further area, where public money can have 
direct positive effects on aggregate demand is 
related to guarantees and loan subsidies. This is 
particularly effective in an environment where 
credit is generally constrained. The guarantees 
can help bridge a lack of short-term working 
capital for companies due to the immediate 
impact of the financial crisis.  Moreover, they are 
a direct response to a central part of the crisis, 
namely the reduced financial intermediation. 
Lower social contributions paid by employers 
can have a positive impact in job retention and 
creation while lower taxation of labour income 
can support purchasing power in particular for 
low wage earners. Temporary reductions in the 
VAT rate can also support consumption in the 
short-run.  
Well designed financial incentives for speeding 
up the adaptation of our economies to long-term 
challenges such as climate change, including for 
example incentives for energy efficiency, could 
further boost demand in the short-run. 
The fiscal response needs to be coordinated 
To be effective, the European fiscal response to 
the crisis needs to be coordinated. In EMU in 
particular, there is substantial scope for 
coordination as fiscal policy stimuli have spill-
over effects across Member States via exports. 
To maximize the impact of a stimulus in a given 
country, European partner countries should 
therefore also engage in a stimulus.  
Moreover, European countries have different 
scope for fiscal action. Fiscal room for 
manoeuvre depends on the fiscal starting 
position, with countries in surplus having more 
room to move than countries with already 
significant deficits. Furthermore, the external 
current account position of a country should be 
taken into account. In countries with major 
external deficit positions, a strong fiscal 
expansion beyond the working of automatic 
stabilizers would only delay needed adjustment 
processes. On the other hand, countries with 
significant current account surpluses might 
already have relied too much on exports as an 
engine of growth. In these countries, a larger 
fiscal expansion would be of significant domestic 
as well as euro-area benefit. 
Combining short-run and long-run benefits 
When using public money, particular emphasis 
should be put on maximizing the return on 
discretionary spending. If public money is used 
to support the productivity of the economy, for 
example in the form of education, R&D and 
infrastructure spending, its short as well as long-
run multiplier is larger than in the case of simple 
transfers for pure consumption purposes. The 
central reason for this result is that public 
spending on productive public inputs has 
immediate demand effects in the short-run. 
Moreover, it increases the productivity of the 
economy in the medium- to long-run. This future 
increase of productivity also has immediate 
short-run effects via expectations of households 
and enterprises. These results are also found in 
modern DGSE models (see Box 1). Empirical 
research supports the notion that public 
investment has relatively strong short-run as well 
as long-run effects on the economy.1   
                                                     
1  See for example: 
 Aschauer, D. (1989), 'Is public expenditure productive?', 
Journal of Monetary Economics, 23, pp 177–200.  
 Heppke-Falk, K., J. Tenhofen. and G.B. Wolff (2006),  
'The macroeconomic effects of exogenous fiscal policy 
shocks in Germany: a disaggregated SVAR analysis', 
Discussion Paper Series 1: 41 Deutsche Bundesbank. 
 Giordano, R, S. Momigliano, S. Neri, and R. Perotti 
(2007), 'The effects of fiscal policy in Italy: Evidence from 
a VAR model', European Journal of Political Economy, 23(3), 
pp 707-733.  
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Box 1: The impact of fiscal policy and structural reforms in the euro area 
Some simulation results 
 
 
The impact of fiscal policy and structural reforms can be assessed with the help of a modern Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium model (DSGE). DSGE models feature forward looking, optimizing economic agents as well as 
companies. To assess the impact of policy measures in the current situation, DG ECFIN's DSGE model (QUEST, 
see reference below) has been adapted to cater for the fact that an unusually large share of households and firms are 
facing credit constraints. Clearly, the usual caveats apply when interpreting the results as model simulations can only 
provide a guide to the likely effects of fiscal policy.  
In general, the model results support the notion that fiscal policy is a very powerful policy instrument in supporting 
short-run economic activity in a credit-constraint economy. Moreover, the design of fiscal policy matters. As the 
table below shows, different fiscal measures have very different short-run multipliers. In general, expenditure 
measures are a more powerful tool than tax cuts, since the effect of the latter depends on the private sector response. 
For example, tax reductions can lead to an increase of private savings. On the expenditure side, investment appears 
to be among the more powerful fiscal tools. The central advantage of government investment relative to government 
purchases for consumption purposes is that an investment expenditure does not only generate short-run demand but 
also entails future increases in potential output, which have potentially additional positive short-run effects through 
expectation channels. Investment tax credits have the largest multipliers on the real economy, while the multiplier of 
transfers is comparatively small.  
Simulations also show that structural reforms can have significant short-term as well as long-run effects. Increasing 
competition in goods markets, reducing administrative burdens for enterprises as well as lowering the degree of 
imperfect competition in labour markets benefit the economy in the short as well as the long-run. These reforms will 
also help to offset the effect of the fiscal stimulus on debt to GDP ratios. 
 
Effect of fiscal policy and structural reforms on GDP, euro area  
(simulation results from QUEST III model – in %) 
Short-run fiscal multipliers (1) Benefits of structural reforms 
  Year 1  Year 1 Year 5
consumption 0.89 1 pp goods markup reduction 0.13 0.37
investment 1.06 10% reduction in administrative burden 0.42 0.57
transfers 0.59 3% wage markup reduction 0.09 0.72
investment tax credit 1.67   
labour tax 0.6   
VAT 0.68   
    
(1) Fiscal multipliers give effect of 1pp of GDP impulse in the corresponding government spending or revenue item on GDP in 
year 1.  
(2) The structural reform multipliers show the increase of GDP after 1 and 5 years of the respective structural reform.  
Source: Commission services   
  
There are merits in tailoring recovery programmes to starting conditions at Member State level. The size of the fiscal 
impulse should take account of the initial deficit and debt position as well as of the current account surplus/deficit 
positions. The central advantage of a tailored approach is that current account deficits as well as debt are less 
affected in countries with little room for manoeuvre as these countries move less. 
Overall, simulation results highlight the important role of fiscal policy and structural reforms can play in addressing 
the economic consequences of the crisis. A significant European-wide package would help to mitigate the downturn 
and reduce pressure on employment. 
References:  
Ratto M., W. Roeger and J. in 't Veld (2008): "QUEST III: an estimated DSGE model of the euro area with fiscal and monetary 
policy", European Economy, Economic Papers. July  N°353. European Commission. Brussels. 
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In practical terms, this suggests to frontload 
public investment in projects which could benefit 
SMEs and could support long-term public policy 
goals such as improving infrastructure 
endowments or tackling climate change. An 
improved quality of public finances will foster 
long-term welfare and growth and also have 
short-run benefits.2 
Regarding some sectors particularly affected by 
the financial crisis, such as the construction and 
automobile sector, the European Commission 
proposes a 'green' initiative, which would consist 
of a public private partnership boosting 
investment into research to increase energy 
efficiency and reduce pollution in construction 
and transport.  
The fiscal stimulus should be accompanied 
by structural reforms that support demand 
and promote resilience 
While the most immediate impact on growth and 
jobs in the short-run needs to come from the 
monetary and fiscal stimulus, a comprehensive 
recovery plan also needs to encompass an 
ambitious structural reform agenda tailored to 
the needs of individual Member States. Some 
structural reforms can also contribute to 
bolstering aggregate demand in the short term. 
Moreover, structural reforms can strengthen the 
economy's adjustment capacity needed for a 
rapid recovery.  
The Lisbon strategy encompasses structural 
reforms that could also be an appropriate short-
term policy response to the crisis. In particular, 
Member States should consider supporting 
consumer purchasing power through improved 
market functioning leading to price reductions. 
They should also address competitiveness 
problems by reinforcing the link between wage 
setting mechanisms and productivity 
developments and should support employment 
and labour market transitions by improving 
flexibility of working time arrangements and 
enhancing employment services.  
                                                     
2  Kneller, R., M.F. Bleaney and N. Gemmell (1999), 'Fiscal 
policy and growth: evidence from OECD countries', 
Journal of Public Economics, vol. 74(2), pages 171-190, 
November.   
The Recovery Plan proposes a set of measures 
that are particularly relevant to cushion the 
impact of economic slowdown and facilitate a 
quick rebound. These include a major European 
employment support initiative – with simplified 
criteria for the European Social Fund – as well as 
revised rules for the European Globalisation 
Adjustment Fund and active inclusion and 
integrated flexicurity policies. Administrative 
burdens for small businesses should be eased by 
quickly implementing the European Small 
Business Act while at the same time access to 
financing has to be enhanced.  Europe should 
also continue to invest in the future by 
improving infrastructure, for example in 
broadband infrastructure projects and by 
boosting research and investment in 'green' 
technologies and products, e.g. by improving 
energy efficiency in buildings.  
The financial crisis and the subsequent squeeze 
on financial resources in the public and private 
sector risk delaying planned R&D and education 
investments. Such decisions would amount to 
major capital and knowledge destruction with 
very negative effects for Europe's growth and 
employment prospects. Member States should, 
instead, follow the examples of those countries 
that have had the foresight to increase R&D and 
education expenditure in such difficult economic 
times. Such policies will boost long-run potential 
and prevent immediate negative effects on 
demand of otherwise reduced R&D and 
education spending. 
Finally and crucially, structural reforms – either 
by making public expenditure more efficient or 
by raising structural growth rates – will also help 
offset the inevitable consequences of a 
discretionary fiscal stimulus on the sustainability 
of public finances in the longer run. 
Working towards global solutions 
The challenges the EU is facing are part of the 
global macro economic challenges highlighted by 
the recent Summit on Financial Markets and the 
World Economy in Washington. The Recovery 
Plan will form part of the EU's contribution to 
closer international macro-economic co-
operation. A central challenge in the years to 
come will be to keep global trade moving. This 
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implies that Europe will continue to contribute 
to global free trade agreements. 
Conclusions 
Summing up, a coordinated European response 
to the emerging crisis and deteriorating economic 
situation is warranted. The response should 
feature a major fiscal stimulus amounting to 
200 billion Euros of which 30 billion would be 
funded by the EU and 170 by the Member 
States.  Member States have already undertaken a 
number of fiscal measures to mitigate the effects 
of the crisis. The focus of the stimulus  
programme should be on those people most in 
need of public support as well as on projects 
which have – besides short-run effects – also 
significant long-run benefits. Investment into 
infrastructure, R&D and environment-friendly 
technologies will contribute to help Europe 
emerge stronger from the crisis. The fiscal 
stimulus should also be accompanied by 
structural reforms that support demand in the 
short-term, promote economic resilience, 
increase long-run sustainability of public finances 
and offset the negative impact of the economic 
slowdown on potential growth.
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II. Economic and financial situation in the euro area 
The financial crisis has deepened further during the past three months. Extraordinary policy measures in the form of massive 
liquidity provisions by the ECB and agreement on an EU rescue package for banks have prevented a meltdown in the 
financial sector and have brought some improvements in the functioning of money markets since the second half of October. 
Nevertheless spreads on money and capital markets remain elevated and volatile and banks have considerably tightened their 
lending conditions both for corporations and households. The financial crisis has gradually taken its toll on the real economy 
and in the third quarter euro-area GDP registered its second consecutive drop (0.2%). The main source of contraction in 
activity was a fall in euro-area net exports. Gross fixed capital formation also contracted in the third quarter, at an 
annualised rate of 2-3%, under the combined effects of a sharp correction in housing markets and some weakness in business 
investment. Household consumption remained sluggish and its short-term prospects are hampered by continued deterioration 
on the labour market although the recent ebbing of inflation, which dropped to 2.1% in November, should provide some 
support. Business and consumer confidence, which had already been on a downward trajectory since the summer of 2007, have 
experienced an unprecedented deterioration since July 2008, which suggests a further weakening of activity in the months 
ahead.  
The global financial crisis has entailed a significant increase in financing costs for the euro-area private sector. To better assess 
the magnitude of these rises, the report presents two composite financing cost indicators (CFCIs) for non-financial corporations 
and households which were recently constructed by the Commission. According to the indicators, the financing costs of non-
financial corporations have increased by a substantial 160 bps since the summer 2007. The rise has been smaller for 
households at about 50 bps.  
Banks are key players in the euro-area financial system. The impact of the financial crisis via the banking sector on the euro-
area real economy could therefore be substantial. The effect of the financial crisis on bank lending depends inter alia on the 
exposure of euro-area banks to toxic assets, recapitalisation rates, and changes in risk appetite. Econometric estimates suggest 
that changes in loan supply can have a significant impact on short-term economic growth in the euro area. A downsizing of 
banks' balance sheets could exert a significant drag on economic growth, with estimated effects ranging between 0.5 and 6.5% 
of GDP depending on the assumed size of the balance sheet adjustment. Bank recapitalisation is therefore of crucial 
importance to avoid serious consequences for the real economy.  
Productive investment is facing a sharp downswing under the combined effects of the ongoing economic downturn and, in a 
more medium-term perspective, a general re-pricing of risk. In the short run, the cyclical correction in investment is likely to be 
much sharper than in the previous downturn of the early 2000s as the corporate sector faces a marked risk of a credit 
retrenchment due to a weakened banking sector. In the medium term, the financial turmoil is likely to lead to a general re-
pricing of risk that will weigh on equity values and push the cost of capital durably up. This will further impact investment 
demand both through the capital cost and the balance sheet channels. 
1. Recent economic developments and 
short-term prospects3  
The financial crisis has deepened further over the 
past three months. Extraordinary policy actions 
in the form of massive liquidity provisions by the 
ECB and agreement on an EU rescue package for 
banks (see Box 2 for a review of the various 
national rescue packages for the financial sector) 
have prevented a meltdown in the financial sector 
and have brought a progressive improvement in 
the functioning of money markets since the 
second half of October. Nevertheless, spreads on 
money and capital markets remain elevated and 
                                                     
3  The cut-off date for the statistics included in this issue 
was 12 December 2008. 
volatile. The broad-based deterioration in 
financial market conditions has also impaired the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy to 
output and inflation. Together with a marked 
deterioration in the global economy, this paves 
the way for a sharp cyclical downturn in the euro 
area.  
Money markets still characterised by high 
uncertainty 
The intensification of the financial turmoil has 
had a crucial influence on the pass-through from 
policy rates to other interest rates, such as short- 
and long-term bank rates and capital market rates. 
In normal periods, there is no significant 
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difference between overnight rate and term rates, 
such as the 3-month rate. Hence, by controlling 
the overnight rate with short-term (i.e. weekly) 
refinancing operations, central banks usually 
control longer-term money market rates as well. 
However, this mechanism has been hampered by 
the financial market turmoil. Uncertainty about 
banks’ own future liquidity needs and uncertainty 
about counterparty risk (since the 
creditworthiness of banks is unclear) has led to a 
very low willingness to lend and high risk premia 
in unsecured money market rates. Since the start 
of the financial turmoil in July 2007, the increased 
risk premium has caused a high and varying 
spread between money market term interest rates 
and the overnight rate (the spread was up to 150 
bps in mid-October). More recently, tensions on 
money markets have eased somewhat following 
the implementation of the national rescue 
packages and the intensification of central banks’ 
support for liquidity. The 3-month Euribor 
declined to 3.28% on 12 December but is still 
elevated given the 175 bps cut to 2.5% in the 
ECB main policy rate since October and future 
monetary policy loosening that is already priced 
in by the financial markets (Graph 1).  
Graph 1: Money market rates, euro area 
(in %, 1 Jan 2007 to 12 Dec 2008) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
The persistently high degree of uncertainty on 
money markets has real economic consequences 
because term money market rates are 'closer' to 
aggregate demand than the overnight rate. They 
determine banks’ funding costs and are crucial for 
banks’ short-term lending activity. Changes in 
short-term money market rates spill over into 
changes of non-banks' short-term borrowing 
costs because the lending conditions of a large 
share of short-term lending contracts with the 
non-bank sector are linked to the 3-month 
money market rate. Furthermore, the costs of 
other sources of bank funding have also 
increased. Banks now pay higher spreads on their 
securities and they have raised rates on deposits 
to attract customers. In addition, as a 
consequence of the past months' sharp declines 
euro-area banks' stock prices, the costs of raising 
equity capital have risen considerably since mid-
2007.   
Tighter financing conditions for households 
and corporations 
Disruptions in the money markets have led 
banks to tighten their lending conditions for both 
corporations and households. This has taken the 
form of increases in lending rates but also 
tightened non-price conditions (e.g. size of loan, 
collateral requirements, etc.). In normal times, 
corporate borrowers can react to the tightening 
in lending standards by switching to market-
based instruments of funding. The availability of 
alternative sources of funding has however also 
been disrupted.  
Equity prices have weakened sharply on the back 
of deteriorating earnings and recession fears. In 
Europe, the Eurostoxx50 has declined by around 
45% so far this year. While these losses can partly 
be explained by the collapsing prices of some 
troubled financial stocks, the fall in equity prices 
has been broad-based across sectors (Graph 2). 
Graph 2: Equity prices, euro area  
(Jan 2007 = 100 – 2 Jan 2007 to 12 Dec 2008) (1) 
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(1)Equity prices are measured by the Eurostoxx50 index. 
Source: EcoWin. 
 European Commission 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs  
 
 
 
- 13 - 
Box 2: Rescue packages of euro-area Member States 
 
In response to the financial crisis, EU Member States agreed in October on a coordinated approach to support 
systemic financial institutions and to restore confidence in the markets. Members States are committed to coordinate 
closely their national schemes/rescue packages and to take into considerations potential cross-border effects of 
national decisions. Coordination is crucial as it is unlikely that the impact of the overall EU package can be optimised 
if the measures contained in national plans are not adequately aligned on a cross-border basis. Inconsistencies – 
particularly in respect of lending guarantees – could distort the functioning of credit markets and interfered with 
liquidity management by central banks. Moreover, to avoid opportunities for 'rescue arbitrage' and so fragment the 
Internal Market for financial services and to guarantee the level playing field between beneficiaries and non-
beneficiaries, the Commission played from the outset a decisive role in clarifying the application of state aid rules to 
measures taken to support financial institutions during the crisis.(1) In particular, beginning of December,  the 
Commission issued a set of recommendations aimed at establishing an appropriate framework for the 
recapitalization operations.(2) 
The national plans comprise various elements, including: state-backed guarantees for bank liabilities, increased access 
to liquidity from central banks (in some case covered by state guarantee) and/or capital injections into financial 
institutions. Almost all Member States have announced an increase in the level of minimum deposit insurance 
(Deposit Guarantee Scheme). Since the beginning of October, fourteen plans (eleven for the euro area) - 
comprehensive or a sub-selection of components - have been endorsed by the Commission. Some Member States 
have not yet notified the full scale of their national interventions.  
 
 Recapitalisation  Guarantee on bank 
liabilities (short and 
medium term, including 
blanket guarantee) 
Liquidity support (via 
central bank, possibly 
with state guarantee) 
Deposit 
Guarantee 
Scheme 
Belgium Fortis: €4.7bn ** Dexia: €3bn ** 
Ethias: €1.5bn * 
KBC: €3.5bn ** 
Guarantee Fortis: €150bn 
(contingent) ** 
Guarantee Dexia: €150bn 
(contigent) ** 
Possibility to extend to 
other banks 
Liquidity support by the 
central bank for Dexia ** 
and Fortis ** 
€100.000 
Germany Stabilization fund: €80bn ** 
BayernLB (€10bn)** and 
Commerzbank (€8.2bn) 
applied for recapitalization 
Previously:  
West LB  * 
IKB ** 
Sachsen LB ** 
Stabilization Fund €400bn 
(contingent, €20bn 
budgeted for possible loss 
on guarantee) ** 
BayernLB (€4.8bn)**, 
Hypo and Commerzbank 
applied for guarantee 
Previously €50bn guarantee 
for Hypo ** 
 
 
100% 
Greece Recapitalization: €5bn ** Bond loan scheme: €8bn ** 
Guarantee on medium to 
long-term bank borrowing: 
€15bn (contingent) ** 
 €100.000 
Spain Asset purchase: Fund for acquisition of Financial 
assets €30bn expandable to 
€50bn ** 
Guarantee, including 
interbank €100bn * 
  
€100.000 
France Dexia: €1bn ** Fund for recapitalization: 
€40bn ** 
6 main banks applied for a 
total amount of €10.5bn 
 
Refinancing: SRAEC: 
Société de refinancement 
des activités des 
établissements de crédits: € 
265bn ** 
 €70.000 
 
Ireland Possible (not confirmed, €16bn ?) 
 
"Blanket" guarantee: no 
amount specified 
(estimated €400bn 
contingent) ** 
 €100.000 
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Italy Subscription for capital raising by banks (€30bn, to 
be confirmed)  
Guarantee scheme (various 
modalities including swap 
operation), no amount 
specified ** 
Guarantee for refinancing 
provided by the central 
bank: €40bn ** 
 
Luxembourg Fortis: €2.5bn ** Dexia: €376m ** 
   
Malta     €100.000 
The 
Netherlands 
Fortis: €16.8bn * 
Fund for recapitalization: 
€20bn of which 
ING: €10bn **  
Aegon: €3bn ** 
SNS Reaal: ? * 
Guarantee on bank 
liabilities: €200bn ** 
 €100.000 
 
Austria Recapitalization Fund: €15bn ** 
Erste Bank applied for 
€2.7bn 
Guarantee for interbank, 
possibly via swap: € 85bn) 
** 
Establishment of clearing 
house for liquidity (€180m 
in equity + €4bn 
contingent guarantee) ** 
 
100% 
Portugal Recapitalization: €4bn * of which 
BPN (nationalization) * 
 
Guarantee: Short and 
medium term debt: €20bn 
(contingent) ** 
  
€100.000 
Slovenia  Guarantee scheme (€12bn) ** 
 100% 
Finland Capital injection scheme *  
Guarantee scheme: €50bn 
(contingent) ** 
Kaupthing Bank * 
 € 50.000 
 
Note: ** indicate that the decision has been adopted by the Commission, * indicates the public intervention has been notified and/or is under 
assessment. 
 
(1)  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52008XC1025(01):EN:NOT 
(2) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/legislation/recapitalisation_communication.pdf 
 
In addition to the increase in the cost of equity 
capital, corporations have faced a sharp rise in 
the cost of bond financing. An important reason 
for the difficulties in market-based funding stems 
from the impact of financial market tensions on 
households’ and corporations’ assets. Due to 
asymmetric information on credit markets, 
agents' ability to borrow depends on the value of 
their collateral. The financial market turmoil has 
altered the valuation of those assets that 
borrowers pledge as collateral. Sharp corrections 
in housing markets and stock markets have put 
households and corporations' (both financial and 
non-financial) balance sheets under additional 
financial strains and led to a deterioration in 
borrowing conditions. Moreover, weakened 
balance sheets have contributed to higher 
corporate default probabilities. Credit markets 
have reacted with significant increases in 
corporate bond spreads. The spread on 10-year 
BBB-corporate bonds is currently above 400 bps, 
whereas the spread on A-corporate bonds is 
above 300 bps, thus far above the levels seen 
before the outbreak of the financial turmoil in 
July 2007 (Graph 3).  
Graph 3: Corporate bond spreads, euro area 
(in bps, 1 Jan 2007 to 12 Dec 2008) 
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The higher risk aversion and the corresponding 
'flight to quality', together with the large actual 
and contingent liabilities assumed by the public 
sector in the bank rescue packages, have also 
resulted in a widening of spreads for government 
bonds within the euro area. These spreads, which 
were negligible in the pre-crisis period, are now 
in the range of 50 bps (France) to more than 
220 bps (Greece), reflecting higher perceptions 
of credit risk and to some extent increases in 
liquidity premia against the backdrop of 
expectations of higher future borrowing needs. It 
should, however, also be noted that the financing 
costs have not increased to the same extent given 
that the underlying reference rate, the German 
Bund, has decreased by more than 135 bps since 
the beginning of the year. In particular, the 
negative growth outlook and expectations of 
interest rate cuts have weighed on yields. 
A puzzling development has been that the 
financial market turbulences did not have a 
prominent impact on credit data for a long time. 
While distorted interbank and money markets 
may have complicated banks’ cash management, 
banks were able to provide additional lending to 
their customers, although at a decreasing rate of 
growth. More recently, however, the impact of 
the financial market turmoil has started to show 
clearly on monetary developments. Money and 
credit growth in the euro area has been 
moderating over recent quarters, though it has 
not collapsed. The annual growth rate of the 
broad M3 money aggregate is currently at 8.6%, 
having steadily decreased from 12.3% in October 
2007. Loans to non-financial corporations in 
particular are still in demand, however, and are 
continuing to grow at double-digit though 
moderating annual rates across all maturities. 
One factor that may explain the resilience of 
bank financing is that corporations made use of 
pre-committed credit lines and thus banks have 
had no option but to keep on lending. Overall, 
evidence from the ECB bank lending survey 
shows that banks have already tightened lending 
conditions substantially and plan to continue to 
do so in the coming months. It is likely that loan 
growth rates will decline significantly in the 
coming months on account of weaker economic 
activity and tighter credit conditions (see 
Section 3, 'Bank lending and transmission to the 
real economy', for a further discussion).  
While it is still too early to assess from the data 
whether the deteriorating economic and financial 
circumstances will lead to a credit crunch (i.e. 
constrained credit supply to objectively profitable 
investment projects) or 'only' to credit rationing 
(i.e. constrained credit supply because formerly 
profitable investment projects are no longer 
considered profitable by the lender), the risk of a 
credit crunch is clearly higher now. In a context 
of heightened risk aversion and balance-sheet 
repair, it may be rational for each individual bank 
to be more cautious than necessary and cut 
lending, but such behaviour would turn into a 
deeper recession and a self-fulfilling prophecy of 
high default rates. As discussed further in 
Section 3, shifts in bank-loan supply can have a 
substantial impact on economic growth in the 
euro area. The emergence of a full-blown credit 
crunch will therefore largely depend on the 
extent to which euro-area banks manage to offset 
the balance sheet losses incurred on US sub-
prime markets with fresh capital injections. 
Exchange rates with high volatility  
The financial crisis has also led to significant 
exchange-rate moves and high volatility. In 
addition to traditional determinants like growth 
and interest rate differentials, movements in 
exchange rate markets have recently been driven 
by large portfolio shifts as a result of the financial 
crisis and changes in the price of risk. In the 
wake of the crisis demand for risky assets has 
diminished, so that large and liquid currencies 
have acted as safe havens, while smaller currency 
areas have seen waning demand and capital 
flight. Although the current crisis emanated from 
the US mortgage market, the US dollar seems to 
be retaining its safe-haven status.  
Since late summer 2008 the euro has incurred 
significant losses against the US dollar. Growth 
projections for the euro area have deteriorated 
sharply, also relative to growth projections for 
the US, and markets’ expectations of euro-area 
policy interest rates have declined. This has led to 
a significant depreciation of the euro against the 
US dollar. This trend was given further 
momentum by the decline in oil prices which 
reduced the US's need for capital to finance its 
still-high current account deficit. Since reaching a 
record high of slightly above 1.60 against the US 
dollar in mid-July, the euro has fallen back to 
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around 1.30 before regaining some ground to 
around 1.40 in mid-December. The euro-yen rate 
also fell to 116 in October from a peak of 170 at 
the end of July as interest rate expectations 
shifted in favour of the yen and investors 
unwound carry trades that were funded using 
low-interest rate currencies. Recently, the yen has 
stopped its appreciation trend following 
speculation that the Japanese government would 
prevent an excessive appreciation of the 
currency.  
Graph 4: Euro, dollar and yen exchange rates 
(2 Jan 2006 to 12 Dec 2008) 
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Source: EcoWin. 
In real effective terms, the euro has depreciated 
by close to 4% since the beginning of the year. 
The financial crisis implies a high risk of further 
large exchange rate moves. 
The euro-area economy has entered 
recession territory 
The financial crisis is gradually taking its toll on 
the real economy. In the third quarter, euro-area 
GDP was down by 0.2% compared to the 
second quarter. This was the second consecutive 
quarter of negative growth. Euro-area activity 
was dragged down by the contraction in both 
investment and net exports. The drop in the 
third quarter was the result of declines in GDP 
of 0.5% in Germany and Italy and of 0.2% in 
Spain. Countries such as Austria, Belgium and 
France still experienced marginally positive 
growth (0.1%).  
Available hard and soft data point to a further 
weakening of activity in the last quarter of 2008. 
Industrial production has been on a downward 
trajectory since the spring but the pace of 
contraction accelerated in September and 
October, bringing the y-o-y decline to 5.4%. 
Business and consumer confidence have been in 
a weakening mode since summer 2007 but since 
July 2008 the pace of deterioration has picked up 
sharply. In October, the Commission's 
Economic Sentiment Indicator registered its 
fastest contraction since the launch of the 
indicator in 1985. During the past 18 months, 
sentiment has deteriorated more abruptly in the 
euro area than during any similar period over the 
past two decades. In November (last available 
figure), confidence remained somewhat above 
the trough reached during the 1992-93 recession 
but seemed to approach it rapidly.  
The deterioration of confidence in recent months 
has been broad-based across the main 
subsectors, although households and 
construction have been affected somewhat less 
severely than manufacturing and services. 
Manufacturing confidence is still somewhat 
above its 1992-93 trough but, in November, the 
indicator recorded the sharpest fall in its history. 
Manufacturers have reported a marked 
deterioration in both the backward- and forward-
looking components of sentiment. But, 
ominously for the short-term outlook, 
production expectations for the next few months 
have now reached their lowest level ever.  
Graph 5: Consumer and business confidence indicators, 
euro area  
(balances in % – Jan 1990 to Nov 2008) 
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Source: Commission services. 
Households have also become very pessimistic, 
particularly concerning the general economic 
situation and prospects for the labour market. 
More positively, consumers now expect prices to 
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ease in the coming months. Improved price 
expectations helped contain the deterioration of 
household sentiment in November after the 
sharp drop registered in October. 
Strong headwinds for fixed capital formation 
After a first contraction in the second quarter –
the first one since 2003 – gross fixed capital 
formation fell again in the third quarter (0.6% q-
o-q) under the combined effect of a sharp 
correction in housing markets and signs of 
weakness in business investment.  
Investment in construction contracted by 1.6% 
q-o-q in the second quarter, spearheaded by a 
sharp (2.9%) drop in housing investment. The 
breakdown of investment is not yet available for 
the third quarter but data on construction output 
shows that the correction in housing markets is 
pursuing its course. Total construction activity 
(as measured by value added in the national 
accounts) dropped by 1.4% in the third quarter, 
with a particularly strong fall in Spain (2.8% q-o-
q). Data on building permits in the euro area 
have also continued their sharp downward trend, 
pointing to a further decline in housing 
construction in the months to come. In July, 
building permits reached their lowest level since 
the series began in 1994.  
While the downturn in the housing market began 
in the first half of 2007 – and therefore preceded 
the onset of the financial turmoil – recent 
developments in business investment have 
tended to follow the deepening of the financial 
crisis. As discussed further in Section 4 
('Prospects for non-residential investment in the 
euro area'), corporate investment faces two types 
of headwinds: a strong cyclical correction and a 
likely medium-term reassessment of risk premia. 
In the short run, the cyclical correction in 
investment is likely to be much sharper than in 
the previous downturn of the early 2000s both 
because leading indicators foreshadow a sharper 
slump in economic activity and because the 
corporate sector faces a marked risk of a credit 
retrenchment due to a weakened banking sector. 
Given the dominant role of banks in corporate 
finance in the euro area, business investment 
would be highly vulnerable to a breakdown of 
the bank lending channel. In the more medium 
term, the financial turmoil is likely to lead to a 
general re-pricing of risk that will weigh on 
equity values and push the financing cost of 
capital up for the foreseeable future. This will 
further impact investment demand through the 
traditional capital cost channel – although 
estimates show that this channel plays out only 
slowly.  It will also weigh on corporate balance 
sheets (lower equity prices raise the share of debt 
in total liabilities) and thereby on firms' 
borrowing capacity and investment. According to 
econometric evidence this balance sheet channel 
Table 1: Euro-area growth components 
 2007 Q4 2008 Q1 2008 Q2 2008 Q3 Carryover to 2008 
 Percentage  change on previous period, volumes 
GDP 0.3 0.7 -0.2 -0.2 1.1 
Private consumption 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.3 
Government 0.3 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.9 
Gross fixed capital 1.0 1.4 -0.9 -0.6 1.7 
Exports of goods and 0.4 1.7 -0.1 0.4 3.4 
Imports of goods and -0.3 1.6 -0.4 1.7 3.1 
 Percentage point contribution to change in GDP 
Private consumption 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.2 
Government 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 
Gross fixed capital 0.2 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 
Changes in inventories -0.3 0.2 -0.1 0.3 0.3 
Net exports 0.3 0.1 0.2 -0.5 0.1 
Source: Commission services. 
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may feed through more rapidly than the capital 
cost channel.  
At this stage, it remains difficult to say, however, 
whether the observed contraction of business 
investment so far is an early sign of a possible 
credit crunch or related to more traditional 
cyclical factors such as falling capacity utilisation 
(now below its long-term average), deteriorating 
profitability or increased uncertainty about the 
economic outlook.  
Households facing high uncertainty 
Consumption growth in the euro area remained 
flat during the third quarter under the combined 
effects of high commodity prices, sluggish 
disposable income growth and a slow and 
progressive rise in unemployment. The 
unemployment rate increased from 7.2% in 
2008Q1 to 7.4% in Q2 and 7.5% in Q3.  
In line with the sluggish consumption growth, 
the annual growth rate of loans to households 
continued on its downward trend to stand at 
3.95% in the third quarter of 2008, down from 
4.8% in the second quarter. This moderation was 
driven by both consumer credit (the annual 
growth rate of which declined to 4.7% in Q3 
from 5.6% in Q2) and lending for house 
purchase (down to 4.3% in Q3 from 5.4% in 
Q2). Sectors which had long benefited from 
household credit financing, such as the 
automotive sector, already started to feel this 
impact. The demand for new passenger cars in 
the euro area decreased strongly during the third 
quarter of 2008 (-5.5% q-o-q).  
Looking ahead, household consumption is 
expected to remain weak in the next few quarters 
for several reasons. First, available data for the 
fourth quarter clearly points in that direction. 
The annual growth rate of loans to household fell 
further, to 3.5% in October from 3.9% in 
September. Data for October on new passenger 
car registrations fell even more sharply in 
October (by 17% y-o-y compared to 10% in 
September). The strongest falls were recorded in 
Ireland (-54.6% y-o-y) and Spain (-40% y-o-y). 
Also, the labour market continued to deteriorate. 
Unemployment increased further, to 7.7% in 
October. The sharpest increase was recorded in 
Spain where the unemployment rate reached 
12.8% in October, up from 8.5% a year before. 
The labour market has thus now become a 
source of uncertainty for households and its 
deterioration will inevitably weigh further on 
household spending.  
Second, the sharp declines in stock prices in 
recent months should affect household 
consumption through the wealth channel. Box 3 
presents an estimation of the impact of a fall in 
 Table 2:  Selected euro-area and national leading indicators, 2007-2008 
 SENT. IND1) BCI2) OECD3) PMI Man.4) PMI Ser IFO6) NBB7) ZEW8)
Long-term average 100.3  85.3 52.8 55 96.8 -9.5 26.5 
Trough in latest 
downturn        
November 2007 104.1 1.03 110.4 52.8 54.1 98.3 -0.5 -32.5 
December 2007 103.4 0.88 110.4 52.5 53.1 98.2 -1.8 -37.2 
January 2008 101.7 0.76 110.3 52.8 50.6 99.0 -0.8 -41.6 
February 2008 100.2 0.71 110.2 52.3 52.3 98.0 0.5 -39.5 
March 2008 99.6 0.80 109.9 52 51.6 98.2 1.1 -32 
April 2008 97.1 0.43 109.6 50.7 52 96.5 -7.4 -40.7 
May 2008 97.6 0.59 109.2 50.6 50.6 97 0 -41.4 
June 2008 94.8 0.15 108.7 49.2 49.1 94.4 -6.4 -52.4 
July 2008 89.5 -0.19 108.0 47.4 48.3 89.8 -8.1 -63.9 
August 2008 88.5 -0.26 107.2 47.6 48.5 86.9 -5.6 -55.5 
September 2008 87.5 -0.80 106.4 45.0 48.4 86.4 -15.8 -41.1 
October 2008 80.0 -1.34 105.5 41.1 45.8 81.4 -14.9 -63.0 
November 2008 74.9 -2.14  35.6 42.5 77.6 -27.1 -53.5 
1) Economic sentiment indicator, DG ECFIN. 2) Bus iness climate indicator, DG ECFIN. 3) Composite leading  indicator. 4) Reuters 
Purchas ing Managers Index, manufacturing. 5)  R euters Purchasing Manager Index, services. 6) Bus iness expectations, West Germany. 7)  
National Bank of Belgium indicator for manufacturing. 8) ZEW Indicator of Economic Sentiment, Germany 
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stock prices on consumption via wealth effects. 
The impact is found to be, however, relatively 
small. The 45% decrease in stock prices since the 
end of 2007 is estimated to lead to an increase of 
1pp in the savings ratio and a 1.4% decrease in 
household spending in the next 5 quarters. In 
2008Q2, the household savings rate had already 
increased to 13.9%, up from 13.7% in Q1. 
Third, household consumption is likely to be 
negatively affected by the high level of household 
debt. As already discussed in the previous issue 
of the QREA4, the level of euro-area household 
debt may have somewhat overshot its 
                                                     
4  QREA, Vol 7 N°3 (2008), 'Household consumption: 
what are the risks attached to falling house prices and 
high debt?' 
Box 3: Assessing the impact of changes in stock prices on household consumption  
 
The current financial crisis has led to a substantial fall of stock prices in the euro area, of about 45% since the end of 
2007. A fall in stock prices may affect household consumption via wealth effects. As discussed in the previous issue 
of the QREA (*), households in the euro area seem to take an increase in their financial wealth as a substitute for 
personal saving. Therefore, a marked fall in financial asset prices has the potential to trigger a compensatory increase 
in their saving rate, leading to a slowdown in household consumption.  The aim of this box is to quantify the impact 
of the recent drop in equity prices on household consumption. 
 
In order to determine this impact, in a first step, a simple OLS equation linking the change in stock market indices 
and household net financial wealth is estimated. The dependent variable is the change in household real net financial 
wealth which is here defined as financial assets minus financial liabilities other than mortgages. The exogenous 
variable is the real change of Eurostoxx50 index. The analysis is carried out for the euro area as a whole and for the 
period 1980Q1-2008Q1.  
 
OLS equation: elasticities of changes in household 
real financial wealth (1) 
Co-integration equation: Long-run elasticities of 
household savings (2) 
Variable Estimated elasticity  Variable Elasticity estimated (3) 
Change in real stock prices 0.202*** Net financial wealth/Yd 0.63 
Long-term real interest rates 0.0008 Constant 1.38 
Constant  0.006***   
  Error-correction term - 0.23 
(1) All variables are in logs;   ***, ** and * denote respectively  
statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%.  
Source: Commission services. 
(2) All variables are in logs and are non-stationary. Johansen 
approach used to test for cointegration and to estimate the equation.   
(3)All estimated coefficients are significant at 1%.  
Source: Commission services. 
 
The estimated OLS equation is presented in the left-hand table. As expected, stock prices are found to be an 
important determinant of financial wealth. In contrast, changes in long- and short-term interest rates do not seem to 
impact household wealth significantly. A 1 pp decrease in stock prices leads to a 0.2 pp decrease in household net 
financial wealth. Therefore, the 45% decrease in stock prices experienced since the end of 2007 implies a decrease of 
9% in net financial wealth.  
 
To estimate the impact of this change in financial wealth on household consumption, the long-term equation 
estimated in the previous issue of the QREA is used. This equation establishes a long-term link between financial 
wealth and household savings rate (right-hand table). The estimated cointegration equation suggests that a 1% 
increase in net financial wealth (as a share of disposable income) would lead to a decrease of 0.6% in the household 
savings rate in the long run. Therefore, the 9% decrease in net financial wealth would translate into an increase of 
5.7% in the saving rate. Given that the current level of the savings ratio is 14.7%, this would mean an increase of the 
households saving ratio of about 1 pp. The impact on the savings ratio through wealth effects thus appears to be 
very limited. Moreover, it would be spread over 5 quarters due to the relatively slow adjustment towards the long-run 
equation implied by the error-correction term of -0.23. The impact on the level of consumption can easily be 
deduced and shows that real household consumption would decrease by 1.4 % in the long run.  
 
(*)Quarterly Report on the Euro Area (2008), Vol. 7 N°3, 'Household consumption: what are the risks attached to 
falling house prices and high debt?' . 
 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2008 
 
 
 
- 20 - 
fundamental value during the past two years and 
its correction should be associated with a 
reduction in household spending.  
Finally, as already discussed, consumer 
confidence is at its lowest level since 1993.  
Falls in commodity prices provide some 
relief to the consumer 
The only bright spot in this gloomy picture is the 
recent falls in commodity prices which should 
lend support to household disposable income 
and somewhat encourage household 
consumption. After reaching a peak of 4% in 
July, headline inflation has come down steadily to 
3.6% in October and 2.1% in November.  
Graph 6: Oil price developments  
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Source: EcoWin. 
Movements in oil prices and base effects have 
been the main source of disinflation in recent 
months. The intensification of the financial crisis 
and the prospects of contagion of the real 
economy have led to a strong reduction in oil 
prices over the past five months. On 
December 12, a barrel of Brent crude oil was 
trading at round EUR 32 (USD 42.7, down from 
a peak of USD 143.3 in July). As a result, energy 
inflation fell sharply from 13.5% in September to 
9.6% in October and the contribution of energy 
prices to overall HICP inflation fell considerably, 
from 1.3pp to 0.9pp. Unprocessed and processed 
food inflation is also showing signs of easing 
although on a more modest scale. Unprocessed 
food inflation decreased from 3.6% to 3.4% in 
October while processed food inflation came 
down from 6.2% to 5%. In contrast, services 
inflation remained stable at 2.6% and that of 
non-energy industrial goods increased from 0.9% 
to 1% in October.  
World growth set to fall back further 
Recent data for major non-EU advanced 
economies are not encouraging. After having 
been boosted by a sizeable but temporary 
macroeconomic stimulus in the second quarter, 
GDP growth in the US contracted in the third 
quarter. The contraction – the first since 2001 – 
was, however, modest at -0.1% q-o-q. The 
decrease was due to a decline in domestic 
demand. Leading indicators suggest that 
prospects for the US remain very weak. For 
instance, the November reading of the US 
Manufacturing PMI was the lowest since 1982. 
The Japanese economy experienced its second 
consecutive quarter of negative growth in the 
third quarter (-0.1% q-o-q after -0.9% in Q2) and 
has thus entered into a technical recession.  
Graph 7: World trade and global PMI 
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(1) World trade data covers the period from July 1998 to Sept 2008. 
Source: CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
and Reuters. 
 
Recent survey indicators of the world economy 
all seem to point to a global recession for the 
next few quarters. The November reading of the 
quarterly World Economic Survey continued to 
worsen, falling to its lowest level in more than 
twenty years. The decline was the result primarily 
of a deterioration of the assessments of the 
current economic situation but also of the 
expectations for the next six months. The survey 
also shows that the cooling off is no longer 
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restricted to the US, the euro area and Asia but is 
now also spreading to Australia, Central and 
Eastern Europe, Russia and Latin America. The 
Global Manufacturing PMI gives a very similar 
picture. In November, the index fell to a record 
low.  
Following the ongoing retrenchment of global 
demand, world trade growth continues its 
downward trend. According to estimates by the 
CPB Netherlands Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
world trade growth decelerated further in the 
third quarter with y-o-y growth of world imports 
at about 4% (compared to 8% a year earlier). The 
weakening of world trade was also visible in 
euro-area trade figures. Euro-area net trade 
contracted in the third quarter (driven by a 
strong growth in imports) and was the main 
negative contributor to growth.  
Short-term outlook and risks 
The message from business and consumer 
surveys is clear: confidence is extremely low and 
the euro-area economy has entered recession 
territory. The European Commission's autumn 
2008 forecast projected euro-area GDP to 
contract by 0.1% q-o-q in the fourth quarter of 
2008 and by 0.1% in 2009 as a whole.  However, 
due to the exceptional uncertainty and rapid 
deterioration of the economic situation, this now 
appears to be on the optimistic side and a more 
pronounced retrenchment in the last months of  
2008 as well as in 2009 appears likely. Both 
domestic demand – primarily investment – and 
external demand will weaken further in the next 
few quarters.  
While important measures have been taken to 
stabilise financial markets (Box 2), the situation 
in financial markets remains very fragile. 
Downside risks to the growth outlook are 
therefore significant. First, deteriorating 
conditions in the real economy could adversely 
affect, even more than currently anticipated, the 
already weak conditions in financial markets and 
vice versa, possibly fuelling a negative feedback 
loop. Second, the ongoing correction of some 
euro-area housing markets could be even 
stronger than anticipated. Third, abrupt shifts in 
risk preferences cannot be ruled out. Countries 
with sizeable external deficits and/or debts could 
face more serious difficulties in securing their 
financing. Finally, emerging-market economies 
could be more affected by the financial crisis and 
the marked slowdown in advanced economies 
than previously anticipated. Upside risks to the 
growth outlook revolve around commodity 
prices which could ease further, providing some 
support to household disposable income. 
The mounting risks of a deep and protracted 
recession led the European Commission to adopt 
the European Economic Recovery Plan (EERP) 
presented in Part I. 
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2.  Measuring euro-area financing 
conditions  
The financial crisis has intensified 
Financing costs in the euro area are rising as the 
financial crisis intensifies. The crisis in financial 
markets, which started in July 2007, has 
deepened further since the end of the summer 
2008. The conditions in the global financial 
system have become extremely fragile, reflecting 
the dislocation of several key credit markets, 
notably the markets for interbank lending. This 
follows from the collapse in investor confidence, 
amid pervasive uncertainty about the strength of 
banks' balance sheets. The combination of this 
uncertainty and increased risk aversion, 
particularly since the collapse of Lehman 
Brothers, has led to a generalised flight to quality. 
Important policy measures have been undertaken 
by governments in both the US and the EU as 
well as by central banks to restore financial 
stability.  
Higher financing cost for euro-area corporations 
and households has been a direct outcome of the 
financial crisis, reflecting a sharp fall in stock 
prices, higher bank lending rates and increasing 
corporate bond rates. Elevated cost of capital 
diminishes the profitability of investment by 
corporations and thus lowers overall investment 
in the economy. For households, a higher cost of 
capital mainly increases the cost of house 
purchases, but also impacts on consumption 
loans such as consumer credit. 
This section presents two composite financing 
cost indicators (CFCIs): one for euro-area non-
financial corporations and one for households. 
Recently constructed by the Commission, they 
provide a comprehensive measure of financing 
conditions in the euro area. The indicators are 
calculated by weighting the different external 
financing costs according to their importance for 
financing. 
Higher financing costs for corporations and 
households 
Global stock markets have decreased 
substantially since the end of 2007 on the back of 
increased credit worries, negative earnings 
surprises, recession fears and at times sheer 
panic. In Europe, the Eurostoxx50 has declined 
by around 45% in 2008. A large part of the sharp 
fall followed the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
on 15 September 2008. While the value of some 
troubled financial stocks has deteriorated 
particularly significantly, the decline in equity 
markets has been widespread across sectors and 
countries. Lower equity prices diminish the value 
of new stock issues and thus increase 
corporations' cost of finance. 
The current crisis has been characterised by 
severe liquidity shortages as banks have hoarded 
cash and refused to lend to other banks, driving 
up interbank rates. More recently, interbank rates 
have come down as major central banks have cut 
interest rates and injected huge amounts of 
liquidity into money markets. Long-term market 
rates, such as 10-year government bond yields 
and 10-year swap rates, have declined since July 
2008 after increasing in the first half of the year, 
as the outlook for growth in the euro area has 
come down sharply. And the inflow of money 
into government bonds, regarded as safe havens, 
has added to the recent downward movement in 
long-term market rates. 
The overall increase in banks' borrowing cost 
during the financial crisis has gradually been 
passed on to bank lending rates for non-financial 
corporations and households.5 Estimates suggest 
a pass-through from higher short-term market 
rates (i.e. interbank rates) to banks' short-term 
lending rates of around 60% during the first 
quarter and around 85% after two quarters.6 The 
pass-through from long-term market rates to 
long-term bank lending rates tends to be slightly 
stronger.7 By late November 2008, short-term 
lending rates for both non-financial corporations 
and households had increased by about 70 bps 
since the outbreak of the crisis in July 2007, while 
                                                     
5  Bank deposits are another important source of funding 
for banks. However, deposit rates also depend on market 
rates, and an increase in e.g. interbank rates will eventually 
feed into banks' lending rates via this channel as well. 
6  See Gropp, R., C.K. Sorensen and J. Lichtenberger 
(2007), 'The dynamics of bank spreads and financial 
structure', ECB Working Paper Series, No 714. 
7  See Sorensen, K. C. and T. Werner (2006), 'Bank interest 
rate pass-through in the euro area: A cross country 
comparison', ECB Working Paper Series, No 580.  
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long-term lending rates had climbed between 33 
and 48 bps.  
The increase in interbank rates earlier this year 
most likely continued to feed into lending rates in 
the fourth quarter of 2008, although the recent 
decline in short-term market rates may start to 
reduce short-term bank lending rates by the end 
of the year. In addition, the lower long-term 
market rates should have a downward impact on 
long-term bank lending rates. Beyond the direct 
pass-through from market rates, higher lending 
rates probably also reflect a hike in banks' 
margins amid tighter lending standards. 
Corporate bond yields have increased during the 
financial crisis. This follows a sharp rise in the 
corporate bond spreads versus government bond 
yields, as the price of risk has surged. Thus, the 
financing cost for non-financial corporations 
based on market debt increased accordingly. The 
yield on 10-year AA-rated bonds was about 
90 bps higher in early December 2008 than in 
July 2007, while the 10-year yield on BBB rated 
bond increased around 210 bps during this 
period. 
The structure of households' and 
corporations' external finance 
The amount of outstanding liabilities (stocks) for 
non-financial corporations (not including non-
quoted shares) was €9 354 bn in June 2008, while 
total liabilities for households amounted to 
€4 914 bn, corresponding to around 4 times and 
2 times euro-area nominal GDP respectively. 
For non-financial corporations, external financing 
is dominated by equity (44% of total liabilities in 
Q2 2008) and long-term bank loans (25%), 
whereas medium-term bank loans represent 
around 10% and short-term bank loans constitute 
14%. Market-based debt contributes only a 
modest amount to overall financing (7%). 
Following the decline in stock prices since 
January 2008, the share of equities in non-
financial corporations' total liabilities has come 
down from around 50% to 44%, while the share 
of bank lending has increased.  
Households' external financing is dominated by 
long-term loans for house purchases, constituting 
around 70% of total household liabilities. Short- 
and medium-term loans for house purchases, 
consumer credit with different maturities and 
loans for other purposes with varying maturities 
each represent less than 11% of total household 
liabilities. 
Two composite indicators of euro-area 
financing costs (CFCIs) 
The two CFCIs presented in this section capture 
relevant sources of external finance for non-
financial corporations and households. The 
indicators are calculated as averages of the 
different external financing costs, weighted 
according to their importance for financing (i.e. 
share of total outstanding liabilities). For euro-
area non-financial corporations the CFCI 
combines the marginal costs of taking up short-, 
medium- and long-term bank loans, market-based 
debt and quoted equity. For euro-area 
households, the CFCI combines the cost of bank 
lending for short-, medium- and long-term 
consumer credit, lending for house purchases and 
lending for other purposes. This means a total of 
nine different interest rates (see Box 4 for further 
details). 
The CFCIs show whether external financing 
conditions are moderating or intensifying. An 
increase in the indicators reflects a tightening of 
financing costs and a decrease reflects an easing. 
Changes in the CFCIs are measured in basis 
points. 
For non-financial corporations, the CFCI has 
tightened steadily since 2005, reflecting the 
increase in the short- and long-term loan 
components. Around year-end 2007, a fall in 
stock markets led to a further up-tick in financing 
costs. More recently, the CFCI rose substantially, 
mainly mirroring the sharp fall in equity prices. In 
October 2008 (most recent available estimate), 
the CFCI for non-financial corporations was 
160 bps higher than in July 2007. 
The CFCI for households has also tightened 
since the end of 2005 when short- and long-term 
interest rates began to increase. Around October 
last year the CFCI flattened, reflecting a broad-
based stabilisation of most interest rates. While 
the CFCI started to increase again in spring 2008, 
it has remained broadly unchanged in recent 
months in accordance with similar developments 
in lending rates. Developments in long-term 
interest rates for house purchases have been very  
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Box 4: Composite financing cost indicators 
 
Composite financing cost indicators (CFCIs) help provide estimates of how much overall euro-area financing costs 
have increased during the financial crisis. They give a synthetic picture of euro-area financing costs in the current 
situation where the reassessment of risk has affected some financial prices more than others. Thus, they provide
more information than a traditional single indicator such as government bond yields. They should not, however, be 
seen as a measure of the financial stimulus provided to the entire economy. This is one of the main differences
between them and traditional monetary condition indices, which focus specifically on monetary policy variables such 
as key interest rates and exchange rates.  
This box presents two CFCIs: one for non-financial corporations and one for households. The CFCIs are weighted
averages of the external financing costs. The weights are based on the current financing structure, represented by the
outstanding liabilities of the different means of finance, implicitly assuming it represents the long-term financing 
structure. Thus, substitution effects between different sources of finance due to changes in their respective costs are 
only taken into account to the extent they change the composition of the total amount of outstanding liabilities (both
new and existing liabilities). To smooth the monthly series, a three-month moving average was applied to the weights 
but not to the cost series. Given data limitations, the financing cost indicator does not address the impact of 
different tax regimes between financing vehicles or countries or the effect of possible non-price restrictions that non-
financial corporations and households might face when choosing financing means. Cost components were chosen 
on the basis of their representative power, data availability and straightforward updating possibilities. 
Non-financial corporations 
The CFCI for euro-area non-financial corporations combines the marginal costs of taking up short-, medium- and 
long-term bank loans, market-based debt and quoted equity.  
For the costs of non-financial corporations' bank loans, MFI interest rates on new loans with three different 
maturities are used: up to 1 year, between 1 and 5 years and more than 5 years. Non-financial corporations' costs of 
market-based debt are based on The Economist’s composite corporate benchmark bond yield. In recent years, the 
'Economist's Composite' has followed AA-rated benchmarks quite closely. The cost of quoted equity is derived from 
the Eurostoxx50 dividend yield. 
For non-financial corporations, financing is dominated by equity (44% of total liabilities in Q2 2008) and long-term 
bank loans (25%), whereas medium-term bank loans represent around 10% and short-term bank loans constitute 
14%. Market-based debt contributes only moderately to the overall financing costs (7%).  
Households 
For euro-area households, the CFCI combines the cost of bank lending, applying MFI lending rates, for short-term 
(up to 1 year), medium-term (over 1 and up to 5 years) and long-term (over 5 years) consumer credit, lending for 
house purchases and lending for other purposes. That means a total of nine different interest rates. Households'
financing is dominated by long-term loans for house purchases, constituting around 70% of total household 
liabilities. The remaining eight types of loans weigh between 0.3% and 11%. 
General comments 
While the CFCIs described in this box are nominal, real indicators could alternatively be established by adjusting for
expected inflation (see ECB 2005). This would probably give a more directly relevant cost measure for investment
decisions. The drawback, however, is that measuring expected inflation adds further uncertainty to the calculations. 
There is a mismatch between the definition of the MFI interest rates, which are defined according to the initial rate 
fixing period of the loan, and the amounts of loans outstanding, which are defined by original maturity. The 
weighting of the rates by the corresponding amounts outstanding leads to an implicit assumption of no financing at 
variable rates. This mismatch applies to both non-financial corporations and households. According to the ECB
(2005), the impact of this potential bias is relatively limited and should not affect developments over time. 
References: 
Copeland, T. and J. F Weston (1992), 'Financial theory and corporate policy', Addison-Wesley Publishing Company. 
ECB Monthly Bulletin, March 2005. 
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important for movements in the CFCI due to 
their predominant weight in the indicator. In 
October 2008 the CFCI for households was 
47 bps higher than at the start of the financial 
turmoil in July 2007. 
Graph 8: Composite financial cost indicator, euro-area 
non-financial corporations  
(Mar 2003 to Oct  2008) 
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Graph 9: Composite financial cost indicator, euro-area 
households  
(Mar 2003 to Oct  2008) 
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All in all, euro-area financing costs have increased 
significantly during the current financial crisis, in 
particular as regards non-financial corporations. 
In November 2008, the CFCI for non-financial 
corporations most likely increased further on 
account of the continued decline in equity prices. 
Households' financing costs, on the other hand, 
probably stabilised or even declined in November 
2008 amid lower market interest rates. 
Other determinants of euro-area financing 
conditions 
In addition to higher direct financing costs for 
euro-area non-financial corporations and 
households as stated above, indications of tighter 
indirect financing conditions have appeared 
during the financial crisis. The October 2008 
ECB Bank Lending Survey for the euro area 
reported a steep increase in the net tightening of 
credit standards for loans to enterprises and a 
more moderate climb in credit standards for 
loans to households. Banks reported that they 
had again considerably increased their margins 
on loans to both non-financial corporations and 
households, while non-price terms and 
conditions (size of loan, credit line and collateral 
requirements) were tightened significantly for 
corporations and remained unchanged at an 
elevated level for households. The most 
important driver of the tightening was 
expectations about future economic activity and 
housing market prospects. 
Conclusion 
During the global financial crisis, euro-area 
financing costs for non-financial corporations 
and households have increased substantially, in 
particular on account of the more recent drop in 
equity prices. Going forward, further declines in 
stock prices cannot be ruled out, which would 
raise financing costs still further for non-financial 
corporations in the euro area. On the other hand, 
the deteriorating outlook for euro-area growth, 
along with sliding inflation rates, has put 
downward pressure on key policy rates and 
market interest rates. Overall developments in 
financing costs over the next few quarters are 
therefore difficult to predict. 
Even if financing costs come down in the 
coming quarters, other non-price financing 
conditions could tighten further as banks become 
more risk-averse. Moreover, the economic 
downturn could result in a negative feedback 
loop as banks de-leverage and cut down loan 
supply (see Section 3 'Bank lending and 
transmission to the real economy').  
 
 
Quarterly Report on the Euro Area IV/2008 
 
 
 
- 26 - 
3.  Bank lending and transmission to the 
real economy 
Banks are key players in the euro-area's financial 
system. They are the main collectors as well as 
providers of funds from and to the non-financial 
corporate as well as the household sector. In 
contrast, in the US, capital-market-based 
financing is more important. Hence, the euro-
area real economy is strongly dependent on 
banks' ability to extend loans to the non-financial 
sector. The current note therefore reviews banks' 
lending activity in the euro area and gathers 
evidence on the potential slowdown of lending in 
the next few quarters due to the financial crisis 
and the deteriorating economic outlook. It then 
presents estimates of the impact of bank loan 
supply on real GDP.  
Loans to non-financial corporations are still 
growing strongly…  
Loans by monetary financial institutions (MFIs) 
extended to non-financial corporations (NFCs) 
have increased strongly in the euro area in recent 
years (Graph 10). Year-on-year loan growth 
peaked at almost 15% in March 2008 and still 
stands at 12.6% in September 2008 – far above 
the levels seen in the downturn of 2003. In 
contrast, MFI loans to euro-area households 
peaked in March 2006 with annual growth of 
10.9% and are now down to annual growth at 
3.9% – a rate below the 4.9% low seen in the last 
trough of March 2002. Euro-area aggregate loan 
data conceal substantial heterogeneity across 
Member States (Graph 11). Among the four 
largest euro-area economies, Spanish loan growth 
rates were highest and reached a peak in 2006 
with annual rates exceeding 30%. These high 
growth numbers have been coming down 
strongly in the household sector since June 2006 
and the NFC sector since February 2007. In 
contrast, lending to German households was 
subdued over the entire period while lending to 
German NFCs has accelerated significantly since 
November 2007 and now stands at 11.3%. 
Lending growth to Italian households has come 
down strongly since March 2007 while lending to 
NFCs has been resilient. Lending growth to 
French households and NFCs has decreased only 
slightly since the beginning of this year. 
Graph 10: MFI loans to the private sector, euro 
area (y-o-y growth, in %, Jan 99 to Oct 08) (1) 
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(1) Euro area in changing composition. MFIs exclude the 
Eurosystem. Loans include all maturities and currencies combined. 
Figures refer to growth of loan stock relative to stock one year 
earlier. 
Source: ECB. 
 
Graph 11: MFI loans to the private sector, selected 
Member States  
(y-o-y growth, in %, Jan 99 to Oct 08) (1) 
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(1) MFIs exclude the Eurosystem. Loans include all maturities and 
currencies combined. Figures refer to growth of loan stock relative 
to stock one year earlier. 
Source: ECB. 
… but current data are misleading and 
forward-looking indicators point to a 
substantial tightening of loan conditions... 
Current developments in loan data are at odds 
with the sharp contraction of credit availability 
frequently reported in the press. There are 
several reasons to believe that loan data do not 
accurately reflect the actual tightening of credit 
provision to the economy. First of all, companies 
have agreed credit lines, on which they can draw. 
Tightening loan conditions will only affect new 
loans and credit lines. Secondly, the surprising 
resilience of the growth in loans might also 
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reflect the difficulties companies currently face in 
getting finance via equity and bonds, which may 
be forcing them to draw on agreed credit lines 
with banks. Indeed, financing conditions via 
equity and securities have tightened considerably 
in recent months (see Section 2, 'Measuring euro-
area financing conditions'). Moreover, the net 
issuance of shares has dropped strongly in the 
last few months. 
The ECB's Bank Lending Survey (BLS) clearly 
points at a further tightening of lending standard 
in 2008Q4. The net percentage of banks 
expecting a tightening of credit standards applied 
to the approval of loans or credit lines to 
enterprises in the next quarter increased from 
45% in the third quarter to 66% in the fourth 
quarter while in 2007Q3 the net percentage still 
stood at 3%.  
Graph 12: Bank lending survey and loan growth, 
euro area (2003Q1 to 2008Q3) (1) 
y = -0.05x + 1.69
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(1) Net percentage of banks in euro area expecting a tightening of 
credit standards of loans to enterprises in the next quarter 
(Question 6 of BLS). Regression line refers to 2003Q1-2007Q3. 
The 4 data points in the box are 2007Q4-2008Q3; they are excluded 
from the regression. The quarterly growth rate of loans to non-
financial corporations is deflated by HICP and seasonally adjusted.  
Source: Commission services' calculations based on ECB data. 
While the BLS data start only in 2003, the 
available evidence suggests a strong impact of 
expected tightening on growth of actual loans 
given to enterprises. Graph 12 links the net 
percentage of banks expecting a tightening (in 
the next quarter) to the real quarterly growth rate 
of loans (in the next quarter) in the period 
2003Q1 to 2007Q3. Loan growth data during 
2007Q4-2008Q3 are surprisingly resilient and 
have therefore been excluded as outliers. The 
data suggest a strong impact of net tightening of 
the banks on actual loan growth, even though the 
estimate is biased as it cannot separate loan 
demand from loan supply effects. The net 
percentage of banks expecting a tightening has 
increased to 66% for 2008Q4, up from 3% in 
2007Q3. This should lead to a drop in the real 
quarterly growth rate of loans by 3.3 pp (or 
13.2 pp annualised). Real loan growth to euro-
area non-financial corporations could therefore 
fall into negative territory. 
... due to the impact of the financial crisis 
and negative feedback from the real 
economy 
According to the BLS, the most important factor 
in the tightening of loan conditions is banks' 
expectations of a deterioration in future 
economic activity both industry-wide and in 
firms' specific outlook. This result points to a 
significant risk of a negative feedback loop from 
real economic activity to bank financing, which 
in turn would impact on future real activity. In 
addition, banks' funding costs, particularly their 
ability to access market financing, and balance 
sheet constraints have also contributed to the net 
tightening. However, the relatively low number 
of banks reporting that access to market 
financing has contributed to a tightening of 
lending standards  is somewhat at odds with the 
responses in the special section of the BLS on 
the turmoil. In this section, a much larger 
percentage of banks report tightening standards 
due to the turmoil. 
Banks also reported that the financial turmoil had 
a tightening effect on credit standards – primarily 
for large enterprises but also for SMEs. This 
continues to concern in particular loans for 
M&As and corporate restructuring, as it has since 
2007Q4. In addition, the financial turmoil has 
also had a tightening effect on loan provision for 
fixed investment, with more than 50% of banks 
now reporting a tightening of conditions for 
loans for this purpose compared to less than 
40% in Q2. The last figure suggests that the 
impact of financial market stress on real activity 
via bank lending might be only starting to unfold. 
Regarding the demand for loans or credit lines to 
enterprises, a majority of banks report a fall in 
demand since 2008Q1. The main factor 
contributing to the decrease registered in 2008Q3 
2007Q4-2008Q3 
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Box 5: Banks' balance sheets and the propagation of the subprime losses to credit supply 
 
The banking system intermediates funds between savers and investors. This critical function explains why banking is 
subjected to an extensive array of regulations and closer supervision compared to other sectors of the economy. For 
the banking sector to discharge its tasks, sound balance sheets are a prerequisite to access financing and retain 
customer deposits. Otherwise, credit demand might not be met and monetary policy impulses might be blunted or 
even counteracted by the need to repair balance sheets. 
At the current juncture, banks in the euro area are under stress. The DJ Euro Stoxx Bank index has lost 65% since 
the beginning of the year, compared to 46% for the broader Euro Stoxx index. Episodes of bank distress were 
recorded in a number of euro-area countries, causing governments to provide liquidity and solvency assistance on an 
unprecedented scale, following the principles laid out in the Eurogroup action plan of 12 October. The defiance 
from investors originates above all in the recognised heavy losses on US subprime loans and other credit segments. 
Their transmission to non-US financial systems has been facilitated by loan securitisation. In contrast to previous 
episodes of euro-area bank fragility in the early nineties, the crisis did not originate from euro-area domestic debtors. 
According to ECB bank statistics, write-offs on loans to households and non-financial corporations in the euro area 
only amounted to EUR 20.8 billion in the first three quarters of 2008 against EUR 26.3 billion in 2007. In contrast, 
securities and shares held by MFIs had to be written down to the tune of EUR 80.3 billion during the first three 
quarters of 2008 against a negligible figure for the whole year 2007. 
The propagation of the subprime shock throughout banks' balance sheet highlights the important role of leverage, 
which relates capital and quasi-capital to assets. Indeed, losses hit capital and increase leverage. Following such 
shocks, banks seek liquidity in financial markets, since customer deposits cannot expand due to their relative 
stickiness. Indeed, strong pressures in money market interest rates lead central banks to step in to provide emergency 
liquidity. Beyond immediate liquidity needs, banks also need to bolster their solvency position by raising additional 
capital to comply with supervisory thresholds and industry standards. The extent to which banks can access fresh 
capital is then crucial in order to sustain their existing assets. In challenging market conditions and barring capital 
injections from governments, banks which fail to replenish their capital would have to shrink their assets. In other 
terms, since losses induce an involuntary decrease in the denominator of leverage ratios, banks seeking to return to 
pre-crisis leverage ratios would have to decrease the volume of assets held in their balance sheets (which are in the 
numerator of leverage ratios). According to the so-called balance sheet channel of the monetary transmission 
mechanism, the borrowers' deterioration of their financial position impact their creditworthiness and their capability 
to access credit. Similarly, banks with worsening balance sheet will find it increasingly difficult to borrow or raise 
capital in financial markets adding to further pressures to deleverage.  
In order to investigate linkages between banking losses, recapitalisation, deleveraging pressures and their impact on 
credit, several scenarios are presented. They are based on a set of assumptions and should be considered with 
caution. At the current juncture, a major source of uncertainty relates to the total amount of losses which will 
eventually have to be borne by euro-area banks. Such uncertainty is usually strong at turning points of the economic 
cycle, but is probably compounded by uncertainties on how new sophisticated financial products fare under stress, in 
a context marked by insufficient transparency and pro-cyclical features of the financial system. 
Based on an estimate of global losses presented in the IMF Global Financial Stability Report of October 2008 and 
with such uncertainties in mind, we present four scenarios in which losses faced by euro-area banks are expressed as 
increments of global losses (10%, 20 and 30%), which were estimated by the IMF at USD1400 billion. Various 
scenarios on recapitalisation rates assume the extent to which banks can be successful in securing new capital. This 
depends, among others, on risk aversion levels in financial markets and the availability of funding from emerging 
market investors. Unmatched capital losses would lead to a decrease in balance sheet size, provided that banks target 
constant leverage ratios. Results presented in row 5 of the table show that bank balance sheets in the euro area would 
shrink by 1.5% to 8.1%, depending on the scenario chosen. The impact would however be stronger if banks decide 
to deleverage. Although deleveraging tends to remain contained when banks are facing mild losses, the possibility 
exist that bank will deleverage beyond pre-crisis ratios, due to faltering confidence and knock-on effects on still-
performing assets in the banks' portfolio. For instance, such deleveraging pressures were experienced in the United 
States in the aftermath of the credit crunch of the early nineties. Line 7 of the table below shows that further 
deleveraging would make a significant difference in terms of the impact of bank losses on the size of banks' balance 
sheet. It would magnify the initial impact of losses and cause them to reduce significantly their assets (from 7.8% to 
17.3%). 
As losses on loan and securities seem to be recognised with long lags, their propagation to the asset side of the 
balance sheet and its components may be spread over several years. Since loans (in non-securitised form) represent 
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almost 50% of consolidated assets of banks in the euro area, they are bound to experience downward pressure. 
Banks might be tempted to sell more liquid components of their assets, such as securities to implement their 
deleveraging policies. However, in a period of highly volatile, distressed markets, fire sales might be only realised at a 
heavily-discounted price, and, indirectly lead to further mark-to-market losses on securities retained on the banks' 
balance sheet. Therefore, the assumption that loans could shrink in proportion to the reduction of total assets cannot 
be ruled out. 
Bank losses, capital replenishment, leverage change and balance sheet crunch: several scenarios 
 Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C Scenario D 
(1) Capital - euro-area banks 1760 1760 1760 1760 
(2) Assets - euro-area banks 31538 31538 31538 31538 
(3) Loss level 10% 20% 20% 30% 
(4) Recapitalisation rate 65% 65% 50% 35% 
(5) Decrease in total balance 
sheet size (leverage constant) 
-1.5% -2.9% -4.2% -8.1% 
(6) Change in risk appetite / 
scale of deleveraging  
0 -5% -5% -10% 
(7) Decrease in total balance 
sheet size (with deleveraging) 
-1.5% -7.8% -8.9% -17.3% 
(1) Proxied by ECB data on Monetary Financial Institutions excluding the Eurosystem (in EUR billion, including reserves,  Sep.  2008) 
(2) Idem 
(3) As a percentage of global losses from the financial crisis (from the IMF's Global Financial Stability Report, October 2008) 
(4) Percentage of capital losses matched by new capital raised. 
Source: Commission services. 
  
Beyond the much-simplified nature of these estimates, the results underscore the particular relevance of capital 
injections to avoid disorderly reductions of bank assets. Such disorderly attempts of deleveraging may lead to fire 
sales or episodes of credit crunch. While exceptional and temporary, such capital injections provide support to prop 
up capital buffers. They also send an important stabilising message to deposit holders and liquidity providers, helping 
banks to secure more stable financing conditions on the liabilities' side. Hence, banks would ideally continue to 
distribute credit to the economy. Otherwise, the liquidity position of the corporate sector might deteriorate at a fast 
pace. Supply-side constraints would add to traditional information asymmetries between banks and borrowers. The 
freezing of money markets, where banks normally meet their short-term liquidity needs, has revealed strong 
informational asymmetries. Since even sophisticated investors, such as banks, have, over the last few months, been 
reluctant to exchange liquidity with each other, even at short maturities, a similar phenomenon between banks and 
non-financial borrowers could happen. Small and medium size enterprises or fragile borrowers, whose risk profile is 
traditionally higher, could be impacted in priority.  
 
was a lack of demand for fixed investment 
followed by a lack of demand for M&As and 
corporate restructuring, which had already 
contracted in 2007Q4.  
Credit standards for loans to households for 
house purchase also tightened somewhat, to 
36%, up from 30% in Q2. The tightening of 
loan supply conditions started in 2007Q2. The 
net percentage of banks reporting an increase in 
loan demand has been in decline since 2006Q3. 
The strong decline in loans to households 
reported in Graph 10 therefore reflects to a 
significant extent the drop in loan demand, while 
loan supply factors have added to the drop in 
loan growth only since the onset of the crisis. 
Besides using information from the BLS, the 
extent of the reduction in loan supply can also 
be calculated using estimates of sub-prime losses 
and information on banks' leverage ratios (see 
Box 5). Although these are surrounded by 
significant uncertainty, due to considerable 
uncertainty regarding banks' behaviour and 
exposure, a range of estimates are presented 
reflecting different assumptions on the extent of 
euro-area banks' write-downs and re-
capitalisation. The most benign estimate points 
at a reduction of loan supply of the order of 
1.5% while the worst case suggests a contraction 
of around 17.3%. 
A potentially substantial impact on the real 
economy 
The estimates shown above point to a possible 
significant reduction in banks' balance sheets. 
Moreover, information from the BLS also points 
at a sharp tightening in bank lending conditions 
and a slowdown in loan growth. This raises the 
question of how strongly the deterioration in 
loan supply due to losses in the 
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Box 6: The effect of bank loan supply on the real economy 
 
To assess the impact of bank lending supply on the real economy, loan supply has to be distinguished from loan
demand. Moreover, reverse causality is a serious concern as expected output increases can endogenously lead to an 
expansion of loans. In addition, the lending channel has to be separated from the conventional interest rate channel.
To avoid these problems, a method recently proposed by Driscoll (2004) for US states is applied to the Member
States of the euro area.  The central idea is that euro-area Member States can be considered as small open economies
with a common monetary policy. State-specific money demand shocks are automatically accommodated. To the
extent that banks rely on deposits as source of finance for lending, state-specific money demand shocks can be used 
as instruments to identify state-specific bank lending supply.   
 
In a first step, all variables are calculated as deviation from the euro-area average. This allows to remove the effect of 
the common monetary policy. Money demand is estimated with panel fixed effects in deviations from the euro-area 
average. In a first specification, we employ the deposit interest rate (as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding
money) and real GDP as explanatory variables (Column A in the table below). In a second specification we use 
inflation (again as a measure of the opportunity cost of holding money - see also Dreger and Wolters 2006) and real 
GDP(Column B). Both specifications deliver plausible estimates of country-specific money demand.  
 
In a second step, the importance of deposits for bank lending is verified. The results indicate that money demand
shocks are a significant determinant of bank loan supply. Loan supply reacts with a lag to the money demand shock. 
In the third step, the effect of bank loans is assessed in an instrumental variable estimation, where actual loans are
instrumented with the shocks to money demand to capture the loan supply effect. All estimations include fixed 
effects.  
 
The estimation results presented in columns C and D indicate that loan supply has a significant impact on real GDP
growth with a lag of 1 quarter. The coefficient presented in column D, which is estimated for the sample 1999-2008, 
shows that a drop of real quarterly loan growth by 1 % would lower the real quarterly growth rate of GDP by 
0.37 %. The coefficient is significant on a 5 % level. The coefficient in equation C would suggest a drop by 0.44 %, 
but is only significant at a 10 % level. It should be noted, that the coefficients are estimated relatively imprecisely.
The 95 % confidence interval for the coefficient of regression D would range between 0.02 and 0.72. Overall, the
estimation results point at a significant effect of bank lending on the real economy, in line with the important role of 
bank intermediation in the euro area. IMF (2008) comes to similar conclusions. 
The impact of bank loan supply on real GDP growth (1) 
  Money demand eq   Second stage IV regression 
Dependent variable m-p   GDP growth 
 A B   C D 
real GDP 1.43*** 0.67*** loan growth (t) -0.19 -0.03 
 13.3 9.3   -0.8 -0.18 
deposit interest rate -0.05**  loan growth (t-1) 0.44* 0.37** 
 -1.98    1.68 2.07 
inflation  -0.01**     
  2.1     
   GDP growth (t-1) -0.35*** -0.54*** 
     -3.25 -5.04 
   GDP growth (t-2) -0.11 -0.17 
        -1.05 -1.91 
sample 03Q1-08Q3 99Q1-08Q3   03Q1-08Q3 99Q1-08Q3 
N 264 506   216 458 
R2 0.41 0.17       
     Instrument A Instrument B 
1. All variables are measured relative to the euro area average. Data are at quarterly frequency. Panel includes euro area 
Member States except MT, CY, and SI. t-values are below the coefficient estimates in bold. * (**, ***) indicates significance 
at a 10 (5, 1) percent level. Instrument A (B) is residual of regression presented in column A (B). Estimation is with country 
fixed effects.  
Source: Commission services 
(1) 
References: 
Dreger, C. and J. Wolters (2006), 'Investigating M3 money demand in the euro area: new evidence based on standard models', DIW discussion paper, 
No. 561. 
Driscoll, J.C. (2004), 'Does bank lending affect output? Evidence from U.S. states', Journal of Monetary Economics, 51, pp. 451-471. 
IMF (2008), 'Euro area policies, selected issues', IMF country report, 08/263. 
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subprime market will affect the real economy. To 
assess the impact of loan supply on the real 
economy, an econometric model – described in 
further detail in Box 6 – was estimated. The 
results from this empirical exercise indicate that 
loan supply has a significant effect on euro-area 
real GDP. This stands in contrast to findings by 
Driscoll (2004) for the US economy, where loan 
supply is not found to significantly affect GDP 
growth.8 The difference between euro-area and 
US findings most likely relates to the greater 
dependence of euro-area corporations on bank 
finance.  
According to the econometric estimates, a fall in 
quarterly real loan supply growth by 1% will lead 
to a drop of real quarterly GDP growth by 0.37% 
in the euro area. According to scenario "A" of 
Box 6, a drop of 1.5% in the loan supply would 
accordingly reduce real GDP growth by 0.55%. 
In case of the less benign scenarios, the drop in 
GDP growth would amount to 2.9% (scenario B) 
and 6.4% (scenario D). The estimates therefore 
suggest that the write-downs of loans due to the 
sub-prime crisis could have a potentially quite 
significant effect on real GDP growth.  
The data from the BLS point at a similar picture, 
even though the contraction of credit supplied is 
not only driven by write-downs and re-financing 
difficulties for banks but also by deteriorating 
prospects for the economy and for specific 
industries. The BLS survey indicates that banks 
expect a significant tightening of credit standards 
in 2008Q4. If actual loan growth falls as much as 
it did in 2003Q1, when the BLS survey was 
showing even slightly more positive figures, then 
real quarterly loan growth in 2008Q4 could fall 
by more than 2pp relative to Q3. Relative to the 
level of 2007Q3, the tightening would imply a 
drop of real quarterly loan growth by 3.3pp.  
                                                     
8  See reference in Box 6.  
According to the estimates this would lead to a 
reduction of real quarterly GDP growth by 1.2pp 
relative to real GDP growth at the beginning of 
the tightening in the BLS in 2007Q3.  
If real loan growth remained at zero for 1 year, 
real GDP growth could be lowered by more than 
4pp relative to a scenario with 13% real loan 
growth.  Overall, bank lending is thus a 
quantitatively important variable for real 
economic activity in the euro area. 
Conclusions  
This section shows that write-downs of euro-area 
banks due to losses in sub-prime mortgage 
markets can have a substantial impact on banks' 
provision of loans to the economy. The size of 
the impact depends on banks' recapitalisation 
rates as well as the extent of changes in risk 
appetite. Loan supply could drop by between 1.5 
and 17% according to different scenarios. 
Moreover, BLS survey data point at a substantial 
contraction of loan supply growth, which might 
amount to an (annualised) 13% annual growth 
reduction relative to the BLS data for 2007Q3. It 
is shown that loan supply has statistically and 
economically significant effects on the euro-
area's real activity. According to the estimates, a 
reduction in loan supply growth of between 1.5 
and 17pp would lead to a reduction of real GDP 
growth by 0.5 and 6.4pp. These estimates, 
though imprecisely estimated, suggest that the 
impact of financial turmoil on real economic 
activity may be substantial. Real GDP growth in 
2009 therefore crucially depends on bank lending 
to the economy. A protracted period of weak 
credit provision to the euro-area economy would 
severely affect real activity. Recapitalisation of 
banks therefore remains of crucial importance to 
avoid a credit crunch with potentially serious and 
mutually re-enforcing negative effects on the real 
economy.  
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4.  Prospects for non-residential 
investment in the euro area 
This section looks into recent developments in 
non-residential investment (i.e. productive 
investment) and assesses the risks linked to the 
ongoing economic downturn.9 Investment is 
given particular attention because it is an 
important driver of both short-term GDP 
fluctuations and the economy's potential growth 
that is likely to suffer a sharp cyclical correction 
in the current downturn and to be faced, in the 
medium term, with higher financing costs due a 
general re-pricing of risk. 
Gross fixed capital formation in the euro area 
Over the past 10-15 years, one of the main 
drivers of economic growth in the euro area has 
been the strength in non-residential investment. 
Graph 13 shows that GDP at constant prices 
grew by 30% over the period 1995Q1-2008Q2 
while productive investment increased by almost 
twice that rate, at 60%. Housing investment grew 
by only 20% over the period, with a significant 
acceleration of the rate of growth taking place 
mostly in the recent years, starting with the boom 
in mortgage credit in 2005Q1.  
Graph 13: Gross fixed capital formation, euro area  
(index 1995Q1=100 – constant prices – 1995Q1 -2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
As a result, the share of productive investment in 
GDP grew from about 14% in 1995Q1 to 16.3% 
                                                     
9  Non-residential investment is defined as total gross fixed 
capital formation (or total investment) less housing 
investment. Corporate investment represents about 85% 
of non-residential investment, the rest being accounted 
for by government investment.  
in 2008Q2, while the ratio of residential 
investment to GDP remained broadly stable 
around 6% despite the recent house price booms 
in some euro-area Member States (Graph 14).  
Graph 14: Share of investment in GDP, euro area 
(in % – constant prices – 1995Q1 -2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services. 
The contraction in productive investment 
has so far remained modest…  
While total gross fixed capital formation fell by 
1% and 0.6% in the second and the third quarter 
of 2008, the contraction in non-residential 
investment was more modest. Non-residential 
investment dropped by 0.2% q-o-q in the second 
quarter and by 0.3% in the third quarter.10 This 
compares favourably with the early stages of the 
previous downturn in 2001 when it contracted at 
a quarterly rate of about 0.8%. Recent data for 
non-residential investment also compare well 
with the ongoing cyclical correction in the 
housing sector which started ahead of the 
financial turmoil – i.e. already in the first half of 
2007 – and has translated into quarterly rates of 
contraction of about 0.5% since the spring.  
As noted in a previous issue of the Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, non-residential 
investment turned out to be significantly more 
resilient in the 2001-03 downturn than during the 
recessions of the early 1980s or early 1990s.11 
Traditional determinants of capital formation 
                                                     
10  Growth for the third quarter is an estimate based on 
available data for Germany, Spain and France. 
11  See 'The resilience of the euro-area economy', Quarterly 
Report on the Euro Area, Volume 6 No. 3 (2007), pp 31-
42. 
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would a priori point to continued resilience in the 
current cycle. First, the euro-area economy 
entered the downturn with a relatively high rate 
of capacity utilisation which was similar to that at 
the peak of the previous cycle. There is therefore 
no evidence of overcapacity problems. Second, 
despite a slight weakening in 2008, profitability 
of in the non-financial corporate sector has been 
on a moderate upward trend since 2003 and is 
now above its level at a similar stage of the 
previous cycle (Graph 15).  
Graph 15: Profitability and investment in the non-
financial corporate sector, euro area  
(in % – 1999Q1 -2008Q2) 
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(1) Share of gross operating surplus in gross value added. 
(2) Share of investment in gross value added. 
Source: Commission services. 
 
Graph 16: Cash holdings of non-financial corporations, 
euro area (as % of GDP, 1999Q1-2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services based on ECB data. 
More generally, the non-financial corporate 
sector enters the downturn with balance sheets 
that are at least as sound as in the previous cycle. 
On some measures, balance sheets even appear 
healthier now than at the beginning of the 
decade. For instance, companies have 
accumulated sizeable cash holdings in the past 
few years that should help to reduce the risks of 
financial stress and bankruptcy (Graph 16). 
Similarly, companies entered the downturn with a 
share of equity liabilities in total corporate 
liabilities that was comparable to that registered 
at the peak of the previous cycle.12  
…but investment is likely to go through a 
sharp cyclical correction  
Notwithstanding these positive factors, there are 
at least two reasons to believe that the ongoing 
cyclical correction of non-residential investment 
will be much sharper than in the early 2000s.  
First, the collapse in confidence indicators in the 
past few months indicates that the euro-area 
economy will experience a much sharper cyclical 
downswing than in the early 2000s. Investment 
and GDP tend to move closely in tandem, with 
capital formation responding more strongly than 
GDP to cyclical fluctuations.  
Second, financial constraints are likely to be a 
serious drag on non-residential investment in the 
next few quarters. Despite the development of 
market-based finance (quoted equity and debt 
securities), outstanding bank loans to the non-
financial corporate sector have continued to 
increase more rapidly than GDP in recent years. 
Non-financial corporations are still getting most 
of their credit from banks (as opposed from 
markets via debt securities) and remain highly 
exposed to changes in bank lending. The 
econometric evidence provided in Box 7 suggests 
that the short-term or cyclical response of 
productive investment in the euro area is closely 
related to the availability of bank loans (but not 
to the availability of equity funding). 
Furthermore, evidence presented in Section 3 
('Bank lending and the transmission to the real 
economy') shows that changes in bank-lending 
supply can have a strong impact on short-term 
growth in the euro- area. Investment and durable 
consumption are the most likely channels for this 
effect.
                                                     
12  Although collapsing equity prices have brought an abrupt 
fall in the share in the past two quarters. 
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Box 7: Investment and the financial position of non-financial corporations 
The estimated investment equation presented in this box is composed of two elements: a long-term and a short-term 
equation. The long-term equation relates investment to selected long-term determinants in the neo-classical 
framework of investment (Jorgensen, 1971) to which variables that express the financial position of the corporate 
sector are added. The short-term dynamics links changes in investment to its own lags, lagged changes in GDP, 
lagged changes in the cost of capital, lagged changes in the ratio of equity liabilities to total liabilities, lagged changes 
in debt and the lagged deviation of investment from its long-term value (the error correction term). The analysis is 
carried out by estimating a co-integrating equation using a method that was originally proposed by Stock and Watson 
(1993) and extended to the panel context by Kao and Chiang (2000). The analysis includes 10 euro-area Member 
States during the period 1995Q1-2008Q2. Cyprus, Ireland, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia were not included in 
the panel due to data availability constraints.  
 
In the long run, the volume of productive investment is determined by real GDP, the real cost of capital and a 
variable that represents a measure of the corporate sector financial position. The ratio of equity liabilities to total 
liabilities is a balance sheet variable capturing the valuation effects in the equity value and giving also an indirect 
measure of the external financing premium attached to the corporate sector. The higher the ratio, the lower the 
external financing premium should be. The same valuation effect can also be obtained by considering the ratio of 
total debt (loans plus securities liabilities minus currency and deposits assets) in total liabilities, the results being very 
similar but with the opposite sign.  
 
The estimated long-run elasticities are presented in the left-hand table below. In the long-run, a 1% increase in the 
cost of capital will lead to a decrease in investment of 0.7%, while a 1% decrease in the ratio of equity liabilities to 
total liabilities will decrease investment by 0.11% in the long run. The GDP variable has an estimated coefficient 
close to one, as expected.  
Variable (2) Estimated elasticity  Variable 
Estimated 
elasticity  
Productive investment 1.00 Error-correction term  (lagged by 1 quarter) -0.16*** 
Real GDP -1.14 Changes in real GDP  (lagged by 2 quarters) 
0.38** 
(lag 2) 
Real cost of capital 0.67 Changes in Real cost of capital (lagged by 2 quarters) 0.005 
Equity liabilities / Total liabilities -0.11 
Change in   
Equity liabilities/Total liabilities 
(lagged by 2 quarters) 
0.13** 
(lag 1) 
  Change in  Debt liabilities (lagged by 1 quarter) 0.20** 
The estimated parameters in the short-term dynamics are displayed in the right-hand table. The error-correction 
mechanism in the dynamic relationship has the expected negative sign. This means that when investment deviates 
from its long-term value, there is a reversion in the following quarter. Changes in real GDP have the most important 
impact on investment growth in the short-run, investment growth reacting positively to cyclical improvements, while 
changes in the cost of capital are not statistically significant. Changes in the balance sheet variable have a lower 
impact than the changes in debt, while changes in equity liabilities were found not to be statistically significant in the 
short run. An important impact on the change in investment comes from the change in the debt liabilities. In the 
short run, a 1% increase in the growth of debt has a positive impact of 0.2% increase in the investment growth. 
In the long run, the cost of capital channel plays an important role, the impact on investment depending also on the 
initial value of the cost of capital. When the real interest rate increases from 3% to 4%, given the depreciation and a 
relative prices for investment of about 1, a 1pp increase in the real interest rate will increase the cost of capital also 
by about 1pp. Given an initial cost of capital of 6.5% (or 0.065), the 15% increase in the cost leads to a decrease in 
investment of about 1%. If the initial cost of capital is higher, then also the decrease in investment will also be larger.  
Co-integrating equation: 
Long-run elasticities of productive investment (1) Short-run elasticities of productive investment  
(1)The variables are all non-stationary Im Pesaran Shin (IPS) unit root test 
with two lags and Pedroni (1999) group test for null of co-integration were 
performed. The real cost of capital is calculated as log(1+real cost of capital). All 
variables are in logs. The model includes country dummies. 
(2) All estimated coefficients are significant at 1% 
Source: Commission services. 
Notes:  ***, ** and * denote respectively statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%.  
Debt liabilities are calculated as loans plus securities liabilities. The short-run 
equation contains also two lags of the change in productive investment and fixed 
effects. 
Source: Commission services. 
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Stock, J. and M. Watson (1993), 'A simple estimator of cointegrating vectors in higher order integrated systems', 
Econometrica, 61(4), 783-820.  
Kao, C. and M.H. Chiang (2000), 'On the estimation and inference of a cointegrated regression in panel data', in 
Baltagi B.(ed.), 'Nonstationary panels, panel cointegration, and dynamic panels', Advances in Econometrics, Vol.15, 
Amsterdam: JAI Press, 179-222.   
Graph 17: Non-financial corporations sector debt 
liabilities, euro area (1)  
(as % of GDP, 1999Q1-2008Q2) 
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(1) Debt liabilities are calculated as loans plus securities liabilities. 
Source: Commission services based on ECB data. 
Admittedly, there is no clear sign of a credit 
crunch in bank-loan data of end-October yet. 
Nevertheless, euro-area banks have reported a 
considerable tightening of their lending 
conditions both in terms of price and non-price 
conditions. There is also anecdotal evidence of 
increasing difficulties in access to credit in the 
corporate sector.13 Overall, it is more than likely 
that financial constraints will be a much bigger 
drag on productive investment in the current 
downturn than in its predecessor.  
Corporate investment faces additional 
medium-term pressures due to a likely 
reassessment of the price of risk  
Information asymmetries lead to imperfect 
substitutability between internal and external 
funds, making a firm's capital structure relevant 
for investment decisions. National accounts 
shows that the balance sheets of the corporate 
sector in the euro area are mainly composed of 
equity liabilities, debt liabilities representing only 
33% of total liabilities.14 As equity 
                                                     
13  See for example recent comments by the German 
carmakers association in the Financial Times ('Loan 
drought hits European suppliers' 13 November 2008). 
14  However, quoted equities only represent a relatively small 
share of total equity liabilities (36%).  
assets/liabilities stocks are subject to significant 
valuation effects over the cycle, in periods of 
economic downturn the corporate sector is faced 
with a drop in their net worth (liquid assets plus 
the collateral value of illiquid assets) that 
increases the sector’s exposure to external 
financing through debt through the collateral 
channel. Due to equity valuations effects, the 
ratio of debt levels to total liabilities becomes 
higher in downturns, while in the upturns, the 
ratio of equity liabilities to total liabilities 
increases (Graph 18).  
Graph 18: Equity liabilities of non-financial 
corporations, euro area (in %, 1999Q1-2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services based on ECB data. 
Valuation effects on equity holdings seem to play 
an important role for the investment decisions, as 
there is a long-run correlation between the ratio 
of equity liabilities to GDP and productive 
investment (Graph 19). The drop in net worth 
increases the premium on external finance 
through the so called financial accelerator 
effect.15 A negative shock to net worth will affect 
negatively investment through the premium 
channel (i.e. higher cost of capital) and an 
additional valuation channel (i.e. the increased 
exposure of the balance sheets due to the drop in 
the collateral value). 
                                                     
15  Bernanke, B., Gertler M. and Gilchrist, S (1996), "The 
Financial Accelerator and the Flight to Quality", Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 78, 1-15.   
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Box 8: The real cost of capital 
Economic theory predicts that companies invest up to the point where the return on capital equals the cost of 
financing it. Based on the neo-classical framework of investment (Jorgensen, 1971), the real cost of financing is 
measured as the rental cost of capital that takes into account the prices of funding (i.e. a weighted interest rate among 
the different sources of finance), the depreciation rates and the relative price of investment goods.  
( )
C
I
P
PRCost ×+−= δπ  
where R should be a weighted nominal interest rate among the different source of finance, π is the inflation in the 
price of investment goods, δ is the depreciation rate and PI/PC the price of investment goods relative to the price of 
consumer goods (e.g. the GDP deflator). Due to data availability, for the analysis of the real cost of capital, the 
nominal interest rate that monetary and financial institutions (MFIs) apply for loans to the non-financial 
corporations sector with maturities between 1 to 5 years was considered. Due to the large share of equity liabilities as 
a source of funding, not including the cost of issuing equity, and the yield on corporate bonds, probably 
underestimates the impact of the cost of funds on the cost of capital.  
 
The fall in the cost of capital up to 2005Q4 seems to have reverted to an upward trend. The evolution is mostly due 
to movements in the interest rate and to some extent to the relative price of investment equipment.  
 
Cost of capital in the euro area 
(index 1997Q1=100 – 1997Q1-2008Q2) 
 
Relative price of investment in the euro area and the 
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The depreciation rate. The impact of depreciation on the cost of capital is relatively very small. The adoption of 
new technologies and the increasing importance of equipment with short lifespan (ICT) have led to an increase in 
the speed of depreciation and a corresponding trend increase in the investment required for the maintenance of the 
stock of capital. The depreciation rate in the euro area has been growing from about 4.6% in the mid-1990s to about 
5% in 2008. If depreciation would have stayed unchanged the cost of capital would have been today lower by 4.5%.  
The relative price of investment. The relative price of investment could have a significant impact on the cost of 
capital since it affects the pass-through of the changes in both the real interest rate and the depreciation rate: 1pp 
increase in the real interest rate or in the depreciation rate will increase the real cost of capital in percentage points by 
the level of the relative price of investment, everything else equal. If the relative price of investment goods had stayed 
at the same level as in 1997Q1, given the evolution in the GDP deflator, the cost of capital would have been slightly 
higher in the last four years (left panel of graph above). However, as it can be seen from the left panel of the graph, 
the main driver of the real cost of capital still remains the nominal interest rate despite the slight decrease in the 
relative price of investment over the period (right panel of the graph). 
The inflation differential between consumer and investment goods. The real cost of capital is also positively 
correlated with the inflation differential between consumer and investment prices: 1pp increase in the inflation 
differential increases the cost of capital by the level of the relative price of investment. Therefore, it is not only the 
relative price of investment that is relevant for the movements in the cost of capital, but also the growth of the price 
of investment level relative to the growth of consumer price level. In 2008, the inflation differential between 
consumer and investment goods has become positive, contributing to the increase in the real cost of capital.  
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Graph 19: Equity liabilities of non-financial 
corporations and investment, euro area  
(as % of GDP, 1999Q1-2008Q2) 
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Source: Commission services based on ECB data. 
Econometric evidence shows that there is a long-
run relation between productive investment, 
GDP, the cost of capital and the ratio of equity 
liabilities to total liabilities that captures the 
balance-sheet channel (Box 7). In the long run, a 
1% decrease in the ratio of equity liabilities to 
total liabilities decreases investment by about 
0.11%. Therefore, if the current financial crisis 
results in a long-lasting reduction of the ratio of 
equity liabilities to total liabilities, the economy's 
medium-term investment to GDP ratio will be 
revised downwards. 
Moreover, in the medium run, the cost of capital 
plays an important role. The real cost of capital 
takes into account changes in real interest rates, 
in capital depreciation and in the relative price of 
investment. Econometric evidence provided in 
Box 7 shows that when the real interest rate 
increases from 3% to 4%, the cost of capital also 
increases by about 1pp, leading to a decrease in 
investment by about 1% (for an initial cost of 
capital of 6.5%). Box 8 gives a complementary 
detailed analysis of the method used to calculate 
the real cost of capital. It is worth stressing that 
the indicator of the cost of capital used in this 
section probably underestimates the magnitude 
of the recent increase in the cost of capital. Due 
to statistical availability constraints, it is indeed 
based only on bank lending rates.16 The 
composite indicator of the cost of financing 
                                                     
16  More precisely, the nominal interest rate that monetary 
and financial institutions (MFIs) charge for loans to the 
non-financial corporations sector with maturities between 
1 to 5 years.  
presented in Section 2 ('Measuring euro-area 
financing conditions') shows, however, that a 
large part of the increase in companies' financing 
costs since the outset of the financial turmoil in 
July 2007 is attributable to falling stock prices.   
The capital cost channel is likely to feed through 
less rapidly than the balance sheet channel in the 
short run as it affects productive investment only 
through the adjustment to the long run (Box 7, 
right-hand table). In case of a temporary sharp 
increase in the cost of capital, a 1% deviation of 
productive investment in the previous quarter 
from its long-run determinants leads to a 
downward adjustment of investment by 0.16% in 
the current quarter, everything else equal. 
While the relative resilience of productive 
investment in recent years was partly due to the 
availability of abundant and cheap capital, the 
corporate sector will probably have to adjust to 
less favourable financing conditions in the 
medium run. It is indeed likely that the financial 
turmoil will be accompanied with a lasting and 
global reassessment of the price of risk and that 
risk premia will not return to the historical lows 
registered in recent years even when market 
disruptions and bank balance sheets problems 
are resolved. The analysis presented here shows 
that this reassessment of risk will impact 
medium-term prospects for productive 
investment both via the capital cost and the 
balance sheet channels.  
Conclusion 
Despite its relative resilience in the previous 
downturn and since the beginning of the 
financial turmoil, non-residential investment 
faces a sharp cyclical correction in the next few 
quarters. Balance sheet problems in the banking 
sector compounds investment's traditional strong 
sensitivity to the business cycle with tighter 
financing constraints. In addition to these cyclical 
considerations, euro-area corporations also face a 
more medium-term challenge related to the need 
to adjust to a reassessment of risk premia which 
is likely to have a permanent effect. This will 
weigh on medium-term prospects for investment 
via the capital cost and balance sheet channels, 
and eventually, on potential growth.  
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